773 F.3d 172
7th Cir.2014Background
- Plymouth, Indiana pays police longevity pay by ordinance: $225 × years of continuous service, paid on anniversary, with a 3-year eligibility threshold.
- In 1989 Plymouth enacted Ordinance No. 1480 to prorate longevity when an officer is on leave of absence or not performing normal duties; the preamble describes longevity as an incentive to retain officers and a target for fiscal savings.
- Patrolman Robert DeLee served in the Air Force Reserves and was mobilized Sept. 1, 2010–May 11, 2011, missing roughly 7+ months of his 12th year.
- Plymouth paid DeLee prorated longevity ($900) instead of the full $2,700; DeLee filed a USERRA claim asserting § 4316(a) entitles him to the full seniority-based benefit.
- The Department of Justice litigated on DeLee’s behalf; the district court granted summary judgment to Plymouth, finding the ordinance made longevity pay compensatory for work performed and thus not a seniority-based right under USERRA.
- The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding longevity pay’s "real nature" is a reward for lengthy service and therefore a seniority-based benefit protected by USERRA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether longevity pay is a seniority-based benefit under USERRA § 4316(a) | DeLee: longevity pay rewards length of service and would have accrued but for military leave, so USERRA guarantees full payment | Plymouth: Ordinance No. 1480 prorates the payment based on months worked, showing the benefit is compensation for work actually performed | Held: Longevity is a seniority-based reward for lengthy service; USERRA requires full payment despite proration ordinance |
| Whether proration ordinance transforms the benefit into short-term pay for work performed | DeLee: proration was a fiscal compromise and does not change the benefit’s fundamental nature as seniority-based | Plymouth: The ordinance ties payment to months of active duty, like vacation accrual rules, so it compensates work performed | Held: The formula does not control; origin, structure, and function show the benefit remains a seniority right |
| Whether precedent distinguishing severance/pensions (seniority) from vacation/short-term pay (compensation) controls here | DeLee: Alabama Power and Coffy identify factors (purpose, vesting threshold, function) showing longevity resembles pensions/SUBs, not vacation | Plymouth: Reliance on cases treating some longevity-type premiums as non-seniority (e.g., Jackson) supports proration | Held: Alabama Power and Coffy govern; those cases (and the ordinance’s preamble/history) show longevity is a perquisite of seniority; earlier contrary authority is reduced by later Supreme Court decisions |
Key Cases Cited
- Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 383 U.S. 225 (discusses severance as seniority-based benefit)
- Foster v. Dravo Corp., 420 U.S. 92 (vacation as short-term compensation, not seniority)
- Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581 (pension payments are rewards for length of service; two-axis test for seniority benefits)
- Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 447 U.S. 191 (SUPPLEMENTAL unemployment benefits characterized as seniority-based)
- Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock Corp., 328 U.S. 275 ("escalator" principle: returning servicemember placed where he would have been)
- Jackson v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 517 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir.) (longevity/ hourly premium treated differently; distinguished by Seventh Circuit)
- Featsent v. City of Youngstown, 70 F.3d 900 (6th Cir.) (FLSA context addressing longevity pay; discussed but held not controlling)