Robert C. Morris v. Sherri Milligan
12-14-00332-CV
| Tex. App. | Sep 30, 2016Background
- Robert C. Morris, a TDCJ inmate, sued three prison employees (Milligan, Gordy, Hoisington) alleging confiscation/damage of personal property after a lockdown.
- Appellees did not initially answer; trial court entered a default judgment for Morris.
- Appellees moved to set aside the default judgment, asserting Morris failed to give the attorney general statutorily required notice under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 39.001; the trial court set aside the default and allowed an answer.
- Appellees then moved to dismiss under Chapter 14 (inmate litigation) for failure to exhaust TDCJ administrative remedies; the trial court dismissed Morris’s suit.
- Morris appealed, raising: (1) legislative lack of rulemaking authority for § 39.001, (2) improper setting aside of default because appellees waived notice, (3) Chapter 14 invalidity, and (4) abuse of discretion in dismissal for non‑exhaustion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Authority to enact § 39.001 (rulemaking/separation of powers) | Legislature ceded all rulemaking to Supreme Court in 1939; therefore it lacks authority to enact procedural statutes like § 39.001 | Legislature retained power to enact procedural statutes; constitution allows shared rulemaking; § 39.001 valid | Legislature may enact procedural statutes; § 39.001 valid and does not conflict with Tex. R. Civ. P. 239 |
| 2. Setting aside default — waiver of AG notice | Appellees waived AG notice by failing to notify AG under § 104.005, so Morris argues he was not required to give notice under § 39.001 | § 39.001 requires notice regardless of whether AG has formally appeared or assumed defense; statute plain on its face | Trial court did not abuse discretion; default properly set aside for failure to serve AG notice |
| 3. Validity of Chapter 14 (inmate litigation) | Chapter 14 is procedural and thus beyond legislature’s authority | Legislature can enact procedural statutes; Chapter 14 valid | Chapter 14 valid; Morris’s constitutional/separation‑of‑powers challenge overruled |
| 4. Dismissal under Chapter 14 for failure to exhaust grievances | Dismissal was improper (trial court cited lack of declaration of previous filings) | Morris failed to exhaust administrative remedies against each defendant and each claim as required by TDCJ grievance process and § 14.005 | Trial court did not abuse discretion; dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Few v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 463 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1971) (court rulemaking power is subordinate to legislature)
- Gov’t Servs. Ins. Underwriters v. Jones, 368 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1963) (statutes prescribing judicial procedure do not violate separation of powers)
- Jackson v. State Office of Admin. Hearings, 351 S.W.3d 290 (Tex. 2011) (court rules conflict with statutes must yield unless rule later repeals statute under delegated authority)
- Dir., State Emps. Workers’ Comp. Div. v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1994) (standard of review for setting aside default judgment)
- Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1985) (abuse of discretion standard defined)
- Leachman v. Dretke, 261 S.W.3d 297 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (inmate must exhaust administrative remedies against each defendant)
- Retzlaff v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 94 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (failure to exhaust renders inmate claim legally groundless)
- Guaranty Cty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 709 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1986) (appellate court may uphold judgment on any correct legal theory)