Robert C. Morris v. Sherri Milligan, 12-14-00332-CV

Background

Robert C. Morris (pro se, inmate) sued three TDCJ employees in 2009 alleging unlawful taking, destruction, and disposal of his personal property during a prison search; suit filed in Anderson County, cause no. 349-6270.
Service was returned on the three individual defendants in February 2009; Morris filed an unsworn declaration under Chapter 14 and later moved for default judgment when defendants did not timely answer.
A default judgment was entered February 4, 2010; defendants sought leave to answer out of time and moved to set aside the default judgment, which the trial court granted.
Subsequent activity included discovery requests, a defendant motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, numerous unruly/unruled motions, mandamus attempts by Morris, and ultimately a trial-court dismissal on October 23, 2014 under Chapter 14 for alleged failure to file required inmate-declaration material.
Morris appeals, raising (1) whether civil procedure rules or statutes (CPRC) govern defaults and notice to the Attorney General, (2) whether the trial court abused discretion in setting aside the default, (3) whether Chapter 14 was unlawfully enacted, and (4) whether dismissal under Chapter 14 after long delay and prior default was an abuse of discretion.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Do the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure or CPRC control procedures for default judgments and notice to the AG?	Rules control; Legislature ceded rulemaking to the Texas Supreme Court in 1939, so §39.01 CPRC (notice to AG before default) conflicts with and is superseded by the Rules.	§39.01 CPRC is valid statutory procedure requiring notice to the Attorney General before default against state or covered public servants.	Appellant urges Rules supremacy; the brief argues that Rules should control and §39.01 be invalidated (court of appeals standard: legal question reviewed de novo).
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in setting aside the default judgment?	Trial court abused discretion: defendants were served and failed to timely act or timely seek AG representation under §104.005; their delay showed conscious indifference and default should stand.	Defendants lacked notice needed under CPRC §39.01 (and relied on timely AG involvement); setting aside default was appropriate.	Appellant contends setting aside was an abuse of discretion under Craddock factors; the briefing frames the issue under the abuse-of-discretion standard (trial court decisions on defaults reviewed for abuse).
3. Was Chapter 14 of the CPRC unlawfully enacted?	Chapter 14 is procedural and therefore beyond the Legislature’s authority (rulemaking power belongs to the Supreme Court); enactment was rushed as an emergency and unjustified—so Chapter 14 is invalid.	Chapter 14 is a valid legislative response tailored to inmate suits to curb frivolous litigation; courts have applied it as neutral procedural rules.	Appellant asks the court to rule Chapter 14 unlawful; legal questions reviewed de novo.
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by dismissing the suit under Chapter 14 after 5½ years and prior default proceedings?	Dismissal was improper because Morris filed the required unsworn declaration (CR 11) and the court already had sufficient information; dismissal after long delay and default proceedings was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion.	Trial court relied on §14.004 requirement and found the inmate failed to provide required prior-suit disclosure, warranting dismissal.	Appellant argues dismissal was an abuse of discretion and requests reversal and remand; dismissal reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Key Cases Cited

Brown v. Villegas, 202 S.W.3d 803 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006) (standard of law review for questions of law).
Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1985) (abuse-of-discretion test for trial-court decisions).
Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939) (three-factor test for setting aside default judgments).
Garrett v. Mercantile Nat. Bank of Dallas, 168 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. 1943) (effect of legislative delegation of procedural rulemaking).
Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Cross, 501 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. 1973) (rules of procedure have force of statute after legislative delegation).
Hanks v. Rosser, 378 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1964) (remedies to avoid default: answer or motion for new trial).
Hickson v. Moya, 926 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996) (Chapter 14 abuse-of-discretion standard and inmate-litigation context).