Robert C. Mills v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Shirley Starks, Kristen L. Sparks, Melanie Reising, and Elizabeth Herrmann
2017 Ind. App. LEXIS 180
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Robert C. Mills (pro se) is a retired former DCS employee who applied for Family Case Manager positions in Oct 2013 and Jan 2014; he was not hired and subsequently filed EEOC charges alleging sex and age discrimination and later a Title VII retaliation claim.
- Interviewers (Reising and Herrmann) concluded Mills gave generalized answers, was hard to engage, expressed limited willingness to work only 2–3 years to boost retirement, and appeared uncomfortable with non‑traditional families; DCS hired other candidates (including a male after the first interview and a 63‑year‑old female after the second).
- Mills filed suit against DCS and several individual DCS employees asserting Title VII (sex discrimination, retaliation), the ADEA (age discrimination), and § 1983 (Equal Protection).
- The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings dismissing all claims against the individual employees and dismissed Mills’s monetary ADEA claim; remaining claims against DCS (Title VII sex, ADEA age, Title VII retaliation) were later resolved by summary judgment for DCS.
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed: it upheld dismissal of individual liability under Title VII, found the trial court erred (but harmlessly) in dismissing § 1983 Equal Protection claims against individuals, and affirmed summary judgment for DCS on sex, age, and retaliation claims for lack of direct evidence, inadequate disparate‑impact pleading, and failure to show pretext or causation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether supervisors can be held individually liable under Title VII | Supervisors (Starks, Sparks, Reising, Herrmann) are agents and thus fall within Title VII’s “and any agent” employer definition | Seventh Circuit precedent bars individual supervisor liability under Title VII; the “and any agent” was meant to impose respondeat superior on employers | Court: supervisors cannot be individually liable under Title VII; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether Mills could bring § 1983 Equal Protection claims against individual defendants | § 1983 permits suits against individual state actors for constitutional violations; those claims can proceed alongside Title VII/ADEA claims | DCS argued agency (not a person) cannot be sued under § 1983 and Mills did not plead individual constitutional actions | Court: § 1983 claims against individuals were improperly dismissed, but error was harmless because identical merits analysis would dispose of them |
| Whether DCS discriminated on the basis of sex (Title VII) — disparate treatment or disparate impact | Mills contends interview process and outcomes show sex discrimination and the overall hiring process has a disparate impact on men | DCS argues no direct evidence of sex bias, hired a male after the first interview, and Mills failed to isolate a specific practice for disparate‑impact claim | Court: No prima facie disparate‑treatment proof and disparate‑impact claim insufficiently specific; summary judgment for DCS |
| Whether DCS discriminated on the basis of age (ADEA) | Mills argues question about returning from retirement and statements about wanting 2–3 years show age bias and younger hires stayed <2 years | DCS argues the retirement answer reflects limited employment duration (legitimate non‑discriminatory reason) and training costs justify preferring longer‑term hires | Court: Mills established prima facie age case but DCS produced legitimate reasons; Mills failed to show pretext or adequate disparate‑impact pleading; summary judgment for DCS |
| Whether DCS retaliated after Mills filed EEOC charge (Title VII) | Mills: after filing EEOC charge, DCS refused to interview his later applications — temporal proximity shows causation | DCS: timing (four months) is too attenuated; non‑retaliatory reasons existed based on interview performance and stated limited tenure | Court: Temporal proximity alone (four months) insufficient; indirect‑method elements not met (did not meet expectations); summary judgment for DCS |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552 (7th Cir.) (supervisors are not individually liable as employers under Title VII)
- EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir.) ("and any agent" language limits respondeat superior liability to employers)
- Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607 (7th Cir.) (§ 1983 and ADEA/Title VII claims may coexist; ADEA not exclusive remedy)
- Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (disparate‑impact theory: plaintiff must identify specific employment practices causing the disparity)
- Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (intent required for disparate‑treatment claims; guidance on disparate‑impact proof)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden‑shifting framework for indirect method of proving discrimination)
- Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (ADEA requires but‑for causation)
- Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993) (distinguishing age from years‑of‑service; employer may consider years‑of‑service without acting on age)
- Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 544 U.S. 238 (2005) (requirements for proving disparate‑impact claims)