Robert C. Furr v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 11972

Scott Rothstein ran a Ponzi scheme; Gibraltar Private Bank and some executives maintained accounts at his law firm and were sued for losses caused by the scheme.
Gibraltar sought coverage from its D&O/executive liability insurers (National Union primary; Twin City excess) for a proposed joint settlement; insurers denied coverage based on policy exclusions.
Gibraltar and its executives settled claims and assigned their policy rights to RRA bankruptcy trustees and other trustees for Rothstein victims.
Trustees sued insurers for breach of contract and bad faith; insurers moved to dismiss, invoking a professional services exclusion in the policies.
The district court granted dismissal, concluding the professional services exclusion barred coverage because it applied to "any insured" whose professional services allegedly related to RRA.
On appeal, trustees argued the exclusion should be read severally (only barring coverage for insureds who personally provided professional services to RRA); the Eleventh Circuit affirmed under Florida law.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the professional services exclusion bars coverage for trustees' claims	Exclusion should be read severally; it bars coverage only as to insureds who personally provided professional services to RRA	Exclusion applies to "any insured," creating joint obligations and thus bars coverage for claims arising from any insured's professional services for others	The exclusion applies jointly to "any insured," so coverage is barred as interpreted by the district court
Whether policy language is ambiguous due to interchangeable phrasing	Trustees contended ambiguity could limit exclusion to culpable insureds	Insurers argued plain language is unambiguous and creates joint obligations	Court found language unambiguous in context and enforced joint exclusion
Whether a severability clause would alter the result	Trustees relied on precedent where severability required individual analysis	Insurers noted these policies contain no severability clause	Because these policies lack a severability clause, the Premier-type result does not apply; exclusion stands
Whether precedent supports imputing one insured's conduct to others	Trustees urged limiting imputation to culpable actors	Insurers relied on cases holding "any insured" language imputes misconduct to innocent co-insureds	Court applied Florida and Eleventh Circuit precedent endorsing imputation when policy uses "any insured"

S.E.C. v. Levin, 849 F.3d 995 (11th Cir. 2017) (background on Rothstein scheme)
Coquina Invs. v. TD Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2014) (background on related litigation)
In re Rothstein, Rosenfeldt, Adler, P.A., 717 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2013) (background on Rothstein firm bankruptcy)
Sales v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 849 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1988) ("any insured" language establishes joint obligations)
Kattoum v. New Hampshire Indem. Co., 968 So.2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (contextual interpretation of policy language)
Thoele v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 39 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 1994) (exclusion applying to "any insured" interpreted to include injuries tied to another insured's business pursuits)
Premier Ins. Co. v. Adam, 632 So.2d 1054 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (severability clause can limit application of "any insured" exclusion)