Robert Bright v. Gallia Cnty., Ohio, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 10234

Background

Robert Bright was a nonprofit-contracted county public defender in Gallia County, Ohio; after filing a strongly worded motion criticizing Judge David D. Evans’s plea-handling practices, Evans removed Bright from ~70 felony cases and filed a grievance with Ohio disciplinary authorities.
The Gallia County Criminal Defense Corporation (the Corporation) terminated Bright’s employment shortly thereafter; Bright alleges no hearing or process before termination.
Bright sued Judge Evans, the Gallia County Board of Commissioners (Board), the Gallia County Public Defender Commission (Commission), and the Corporation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (First and Fourteenth Amendment claims) and state-law tort/contract claims.
The district court denied Judge Evans absolute judicial immunity and dismissed Bright’s federal claims against the Board, Commission, and Corporation; it declined supplemental jurisdiction over Bright’s state-law claim against the Corporation.
The Sixth Circuit reversed as to Judge Evans (holding he has absolute judicial immunity because he retained subject-matter jurisdiction over the criminal cases) and affirmed dismissal of Bright’s federal claims against the Board, Commission, and Corporation (largely because Bright’s speech in court is not First Amendment-protected under binding Circuit precedent, and other § 1983 elements were deficient).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Judge Evans is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for removing Bright from cases	Bright: Evans acted outside his jurisdiction and thus is not immune	Evans: actions were judicial and taken while court had subject-matter jurisdiction, so immunity applies	Court: Evans entitled to absolute judicial immunity; reversal of district court denial
Whether Bright’s courtroom/motion speech is protected by the First Amendment	Bright: his motion criticizing the judge was protected speech and termination was retaliatory	Defs: speech in representation of client in courtroom is not First Amendment-protected under circuit precedent	Court: Mezibov controls; attorney speech in courtroom not protected here — dismissal affirmed
Whether the Corporation’s termination violated § 1983 (retaliation / due process / equal protection / substantive due process)	Bright: termination was retaliatory and deprived him of property/liberty interests and his right to pursue his career	Corporation: termination was for legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons (inability to practice before Evans); no protected speech; no cognizable property/liberty interest shown	Court: causal inference plausible as to retaliation, but Mezibov defeats protected-speech element; other constitutional claims dismissed
Whether Board/Commission are liable under Monell for policies/customs leading to Bright’s harms	Bright: Board/Commission failed to protect him and deferred to Evans’ decisions, causing termination	Board/Commission: no direct action and no municipal policy/custom caused constitutional violation; Bright failed to plead a predicate violation	Court: dismissal affirmed — no adequately pleaded Monell claim

Key Cases Cited

Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712 (6th Cir. 2005) (attorney’s courtroom motions/speech on client’s behalf do not receive First Amendment protection)
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (judicial immunity doctrine and its limited exceptions)
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872) (historical foundation for absolute judicial immunity)
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (broad construction of ‘jurisdiction’ for immunity purposes)
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) (policy reasons for judicial immunity and limits of supervisory-review remedies)
Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires an unconstitutional policy or custom)
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (collateral-order doctrine permits immediate appeal of denials of absolute immunity)