Robert Bojaj v. Mary Berghuis
702 F. App'x 315
6th Cir.2017Background
- In August 2010 Bojaj, intoxicated (BAC .26 two hours after crash), rear-ended and killed another driver; charged and convicted of second-degree murder in Michigan based on alleged high-speed, reckless driving showing mens rea.
- Prosecution introduced Event Data Recorder (EDR) data from Bojaj’s Lexus and expert testimony (Toyota analyst Jakstis and MSP crash-reconstructionist Lucidi) that the car’s last recorded speed was 78.3 mph and delta‑V supported speeds up to 126 mph.
- Defense challenged reliability of the EDR and requested a Daubert hearing; the trial court denied the pretrial hearing and admitted the EDR-based testimony.
- After conviction the trial court granted a new trial, concluding the lack of a Daubert inquiry made admission of the EDR unreliable and not curable.
- Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, treating the failure to hold a Daubert hearing as preserved nonconstitutional error and held any error harmless in light of eyewitness testimony, conventional speed calculations, and other evidence of intoxication and reckless driving.
- Federal habeas petition denied by district court; Sixth Circuit (AEDPA review) affirmed, holding no clearly established Supreme Court precedent requires Daubert hearings as a constitutional matter and that any evidentiary error was not so prejudicial as to deprive Bojaj of a fundamentally fair trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether admitting EDR data without a Daubert hearing violated due process by denying a fundamentally fair trial | Bojaj: trial court’s refusal to hold Daubert hearing allowed unreliable scientific evidence to go to jury, violating Fourteenth Amendment | Warden: no clearly established Supreme Court rule requires Daubert screening as a constitutional floor; any error was nonconstitutional or harmless | Held: No habeas relief. Michigan Court of Appeals’ merits decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent; no due process violation |
| Whether the Michigan Court of Appeals adjudicated the federal claim on the merits (AEDPA deference) | Bojaj: appellate labeling as "nonconstitutional error" did not clearly reject his federal due process claim | Warden: state court addressed the claim on the merits; AEDPA applies | Held: AEDPA applies — federal court must presume the state court adjudicated the federal claim on the merits |
| Whether, under case-specific prejudice analysis (Ege) the EDR admission was a "crucial, critical" factor producing the verdict | Bojaj: EDR and delta‑V testimony were highly persuasive and technologically advanced, materially affecting the verdict | Warden: jurors heard EDR limitations; defense presented counter-expert; multiple eyewitnesses and conventional reconstructions independently established excessive speed and mens rea | Held: Even under Ege test, EDR evidence was not so prejudicial; verdict supported by independent evidence |
| Whether invited‑error doctrine bars the warden from arguing harmlessness after earlier positions | Bojaj: government previously argued no Daubert hearing required, so cannot later defend harmlessness | Warden: government consistently argued admissibility and that any error would be harmless or nonconstitutional | Held: Invited‑error doctrine does not apply; warden may argue harmlessness |
Key Cases Cited
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (trial courts act as gatekeepers under Rule 702 to assess expert reliability)
- Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990) (state evidentiary rules are primary safeguard; Due Process Clause is backstop)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (presumption that state-court adjudication on the merits triggers AEDPA deference)
- Ege v. Yukins, 485 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2007) (case-specific test for whether erroneously admitted evidence was a "crucial, critical" factor denying fundamental fairness)
- Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 2003) (no clearly established Supreme Court precedent holding admission of certain state-law propensity evidence violates due process)
- Maldonado v. Wilson, 416 F.3d 470 (6th Cir. 2005) (admission of polygraph evidence does not per se establish a due process violation)
- Norris v. Schotten, 146 F.3d 314 (6th Cir. 1998) (Daubert does not set a constitutional floor for admissibility of scientific evidence)
- People v. Goecke, 579 N.W.2d 868 (Mich. 1998) (defining mens rea standard for second-degree murder under Michigan law)
- Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 685 N.W.2d 391 (Mich. 2004) (Michigan Rule of Evidence 702 incorporates Daubert reliability standards)