9 F.4th 565
7th Cir.2021Background
- Bless was a Cook County Sheriff’s Office deputy (1996–2013) who, after a 2008 on‑duty car crash, received injured‑on‑duty (IOD) status and disability benefits while also practicing law and serving as an elected Republican county commissioner.
- The Sheriff’s Office requires prior approval for secondary employment; Bless submitted some forms but did not have documented approvals for the period Jan 31, 2009–Dec 9, 2010, while on IOD.
- Cook County Risk Management discovered Bless driving and working while on IOD; OPR investigated and concluded Bless lied about having submitted secondary‑employment requests.
- The Merit Board found Bless had unauthorized secondary employment, violated driving restrictions, and lied to investigators, and it ordered his termination in May 2013.
- Bless sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (political‑retaliation and race discrimination) and Title VII (race); the district court denied Bless’s attempt to depose Sheriff Dart and granted summary judgment for defendants.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed: it found no abuse of discretion in denying Dart’s deposition and held the record insufficient to create triable issues on political retaliation or race discrimination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deposition of Sheriff Dart | Dart’s testimony might yield evidence of knowledge/motivation (meeting where Bless discussed accident, offices, politics) | Dart was not involved in OPR/Merit Board processes; interrogatories suffice; deposition would be burdensome | Denial affirmed — district court did not abuse discretion; written discovery adequate and Dart unlikely to produce unique admissible evidence |
| Political‑retaliation (First Amendment) | Timing of events (election 2008, transfers after return, release from consent decree, charges filed 2011) supports inference of retaliation against Republican political activity | Termination was for non‑political reasons: unauthorized secondary employment, driving while medically restricted, and lying to investigators | Summary judgment affirmed — timing was not ‘‘very close’’ and intervening misconduct undercuts causal inference; defendants’ reasons stand absent evidence of pretext |
| Race discrimination (white plaintiff) | White plaintiff alleges comparators (nonwhite) received more lenient treatment and several decisionmakers were nonwhite | No background circumstances showing an inclination to discriminate against whites; proposed comparators not materially similar | Summary judgment affirmed — plaintiff failed the threshold requirement to show background circumstances or similarly situated comparators and did not prove defendants’ reasons were pretextual |
Key Cases Cited
- Stagman v. Ryan, 176 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 1999) (standard for deposing public officials and appellate review of discovery rulings)
- Olivieri v. Rodriguez, 122 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 1997) (public officials need not give depositions absent reason to expect admissible evidence)
- Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016) (First Amendment protects public‑employee political rights)
- Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2012) (burden‑shifting framework for First Amendment public‑employee claims)
- Yahnke v. Kane County, 823 F.3d 1066 (7th Cir. 2016) (Elements of prima facie First Amendment retaliation claim)
- Loudermilk v. Best Pallet Co., 636 F.3d 312 (7th Cir. 2011) (suspicious timing requires very close temporal proximity)
- Formella v. Brennan, 817 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 2016) (proof needed for white‑plaintiff Title VII/§ 1983 discrimination claims)
- Hague v. Thompson Distrib. Co., 436 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2006) (examples of background circumstances supporting white‑plaintiff discrimination claims)
