Robert Baker v. University Physicians Healthcare
231 Ariz. 379
| Ariz. | 2013Background
- Arizona Supreme Court case interpreting A.R.S. § 12-2604, governing expert qualifications in medical malpractice actions.
- Plaintiff Robert Baker sues for wrongful death of Tara Baker against Dr. Wittman, UPH, and related entities.
- Dr. Wittman is board-certified in pediatrics; the case involves pediatric hematology-oncology treatment for a 17-year-old.
- Dr. Brouillard, Baker’s proposed expert, is board-certified in internal medicine and hematology/medical oncology, not pediatrics.
- Trial court granted summary judgment for UPH, holding Brouillard unqualified; Court of Appeals partially reversed, adopting a ABMS-board-centric view of 'specialty' and remanding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Interpretation of § 12-2604(A) requiring same specialty for testifying experts. | Baker argues the statute governs reliability of testimony, not rigid sub-specialty mirroring. | UPH contends专家 must be in the same specialty as the treating physician when care falls within that specialty. | Statute requires same specialty only if care at issue was within that specialty. |
| Meaning of 'specialty' and 'specialist' under § 12-2604. | Specialty may include subspecialties tied to ABMS certification. | Specialty limited to ABMS board-certified areas; subspecialties not included. | Specialty includes areas where board certification is possible, not limited to ABMS 24; subspecialties may count depending on case. |
| Application to this case: whether pediatric hematology-oncology or hematology is the relevant specialty. | Dr. Wittman’s care falls within a subspecialty; Brouillard should qualify if aligned with the relevant field. | Wittman practiced within pediatric hematology-oncology; Brouillard was not so certified. | If care was within the specialty, the testifying expert must be certified in that specialty; Brouillard not qualified. |
| Constitutionality of § 12-2604 under equal protection and anti-abrogation clauses. | Statute burdens access to courts and discriminates among plaintiffs. | Rational basis or heightened scrutiny depending on right; statute serves public health interests. | Statute is constitutional; rational basis review applies where no fundamental right is implicated, and it does not abrogate access to courts. |
| Whether § 12-2604 is a prohibited 'special law' under Arizona Constitution. | Statute is overbroad and violates special-law prohibitions on changing evidence rules and civil actions. | Class is elastic and rationally related to legitimate goals; not a special law. | Not a prohibited special law; rational basis supports its enactment. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Williams, 175 Ariz. 98 (Ariz. 1993) (establishes interpretive starting point for statute examination)
- Gomez, 212 Ariz. 55 (Ariz. 2006) (contextual statutory interpretation framework)
- Cronin v. Sheldon, 195 Ariz. 531 (Ariz. 1999) (anti-abrogation and open-courts principles)
- Governale v. Lieberman, 226 Ariz. 443 (Ariz. App. 2011) (equal protection considerations in § 12-2604 context)
- Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69 (Ariz. 1984) (fundamental right to bring a negligence action and scrutiny level)
- Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576 (Ariz. 1977) (scrutiny standards in medical-malpractice statutes and access to courts)
- Seisinger v. Siebel, 220 Ariz. 85 (Ariz. 2009) (separation of powers and medical malpractice statute stance)
- Taylor v. DiRico, 124 Ariz. 513 (Ariz. 1980) (standard of care and physician specialization considerations)
- Lo v. Lee, 230 Ariz. 457 (Ariz. App. 2012) (interpretation of 'specialty' and subspecialty considerations)