Robert Baar v. Jefferson County Board of Educ., 476 F. App'x 621

Baar, a Jefferson County public-school teacher, co-founded LACA and previously attended meetings from 1992 to 2001.
In February 2002, Baar sent a troubling email about a colleague; following that, Baar signed a Memorandum of Understanding to discontinue contact with that colleague.
In June 2002, Baar received a written reprimand and was transferred; he was told to have no further contact with the colleague or her family.
In September 2005, Baar indicated at a LACA meeting he'd attend and bring dues; this led to a December 2005 reprimand prohibiting Baar from future LACA attendance.
Baar filed a §1983/§1985 federal suit in February 2006 alleging First Amendment violations and related claims; the district court granted summary judgment and later remand proceedings ensued.
On remand, the district court enjoined further prohibitions on Baar’s LACA attendance and later dismissed official-capacity claims while finding qualified immunity for some defendants.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Waiver of qualified immunity	Baar asserts immunity was waived by delay.	Defendants appropriately raised immunity after remand.	Waiver not clear-cut; district court allowed late assertion.
Was Baar's LACA attendance protected by the First Amendment	LACA involvement was a matter of public concern.	Speech/association not protected or outweighed by school interests.	At this stage, Pickering balance supports protection for Baar’s association with LACA.
Clearly established law for qualified immunity	Rights were clearly established; officials should know violations.	Pre-existing law did not clearly establish the right at the time.	Reasonable officials could disagree; qualified immunity affirmed for Jury and Meredith.
JCBE and official-capacity liability	JCBE policy/custom permitted the acts; Daeschner approved.	No final policymaking authority; no Monell policy or custom shown.	JCBE not liable under §1983; official-capacity claims dismissed.

Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1986) (waiver of qualified-immunity defenses possible)
English v. Dyke, 23 F.3d 1086 (6th Cir. 1994) (waiver can occur but not necessarily for all stages)
Baar v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 311 F. App’x 817 (6th Cir. 2009) (prior panel decision addressing Pickering and qualified immunity context)
Williams v. Kennedy, 24 F.3d 1526 (6th Cir. 1994) (imprecision of Pickering does not imply immunity; outcome is case-specific)
Stern v. Shouldice, 706 F.2d 742 (6th Cir. 1985) (pre-1970s cases show evolving clearly established law in immunity)
Guercio v. Brody, 911 F.2d 1179 (6th Cir. 1990) (pre-2005 clearly established-law standard for immunity inquiries)
Adkins v. Bd. of Educ. of Magoffin County, Ky., 982 F.2d 952 (6th Cir. 1993) (Monell liability requires policy or final policymaker authority)
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988) (final policymaking authority under state law; state-law question)
Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (local governments liable for policy/custom causing constitutional tort)
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (basis of qualified-immunity objective reasonableness)