Robert B. Leftwich v. Florida Department of Corrections
148 So. 3d 79
| Fla. | 2014Background
- In 1988 Florida enacted a provisional credit statute (§ 944.277) allowing up to 60 days of provisional credits to eligible inmates when prison population reached a threshold, but excluding certain categories including habitual offenders.
- Leftwich committed crimes in 1989 and received two non-habitual-offender sentences (robbery, aggravated battery); while incarcerated he later received a Florida habitual-offender sentence (1990).
- DOC stopped awarding provisional credits on Leftwich’s earlier sentences after the habitual-offender sentence; he had 410 days credited before the habitual-offender designation and claimed entitlement to more.
- Leftwich sought administrative relief, then mandamus in circuit court (denied), and certiorari in the First District, which upheld DOC’s interpretation that any habitual-offender sentence disqualifies an inmate from further provisional credits on any sentence.
- The First District certified conflict with the Second District’s decision in Downs v. Crosby, which held that under the 1988–1992 statute an inmate who later became a habitual offender could continue to receive provisional credits on earlier sentences.
- The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction to resolve the conflict and decide whether the 1988 statute precluded provisional credits on earlier sentences after a later habitual-offender designation and whether applying a 1992 amendment would violate the ex post facto clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 1988 provisional-credit statute precluded awarding provisional credits on earlier non-habitual sentences after a later Florida habitual-offender sentence | Leftwich: Anderson (First Dist.) interpretation entitles him to continue receiving provisional credits on sentences imposed before habitual-offender designation; 1992 amendment cannot be applied retroactively | DOC/State: Plain language of 1988 statute bars any inmate who "is sentenced, or has previously been sentenced" as a habitual offender from receiving provisional credits on any sentence; eligibility is assessed at time of certification | The Court held the 1988 statute’s plain language bars provisional credits on any sentence after an inmate receives a habitual-offender sentence, even if that sentence was imposed after earlier eligible sentences. |
| Whether applying the 1992 amendment (which broadened the exclusion) to deny credits would violate the ex post facto clause | Leftwich: Retroactive application of the 1992 amendment increases punishment and violates ex post facto protections | State: No ex post facto problem because the Court reads the 1988 statute to already preclude credits; the 1992 amendment merely clarifies legislative intent | The Court declined to apply the 1992 amendment (because its reading of the 1988 statute already bars credits) and held no ex post facto violation arises from its interpretation. |
| Whether prior appellate precedent (Anderson) or subsequent legislative amendment control interpretation of the 1988 statute | Leftwich: Prior First District decision (Anderson) supports awarding credits on earlier sentences | State: Anderson misread plain language; 1992 amendment confirms legislative intent to exclude all habitual offenders | The Court rejected Anderson, found the plain statutory language dispositive, and treated the 1992 amendment as confirmatory of legislative intent. |
| Whether construing the 1988 statute to bar credits constitutes an unforeseeable judicial enlargement (due process concern per Marks/Bouie) | Leftwich: Judicial enlargement would violate due process/fair warning | State: Interpretation follows plain language and legislative intent; not unforeseeable enlargement | The Court concluded its interpretation was a plain reading and not an unforeseeable enlargement, so no due process problem under Marks/Bouie. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (U.S. 1997) (holding retroactive cancellation of provisional/overcrowding credits can violate the federal Ex Post Facto Clause)
- Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (U.S. 1977) (Ex Post Facto Clause limits legislature; retroactive judicial enlargement is addressed by due process principles)
- Gomez v. Singletary, 733 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1998) (recognizing provisional/overcrowding credits and related ex post facto issues)
- Mayes v. Moore, 827 So.2d 967 (Fla. 2002) (analysis of whether judicial interpretation of gain-time statutes constitutes unforeseeable enlargement)
- State v. Smith, 547 So.2d 613 (Fla. 1989) (use of subsequent legislative amendment in ex post facto analysis and interplay between judicial decisions and legislative change)
- Lowry v. Parole & Prob. Comm’n, 473 So.2d 1248 (Fla. 1985) (legislative amendment enacted shortly after a controversy may be considered a legislative interpretation of prior intent)
- Downs v. Crosby, 874 So.2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding pre-1992 statute allowed inmates later sentenced as habitual offenders to continue receiving provisional credits on earlier sentences)