Robert Allan Jorgensen v. State, 11-17-00090-CR

Appellant Robert Allan Jorgensen was placed on community supervision for a third-degree felony DWI (placed June 13, 2014). The State moved to revoke probation on February 17, 2017; the trial court revoked on March 29, 2017 and sentenced Jorgensen to five years TDCJ-ID.
The Motion to Revoke alleged multiple violations, including (1) a Wilson County conviction for driving with an invalid license, (3) resisting arrest in Mineral Wells, and (5) failures to submit required written reports to community supervision.
The trial court found allegations one, three, and five true and revoked community supervision; appellant appealed challenging the sufficiency of the resisting-arrest finding and the applicable standard of proof.
Key factual dispute centers on dash-cam/body-cam video and officer testimony: officer testified Jorgensen “pulled away” when the officer attempted to handcuff him; the video shows the officer announcing “you’re about to catch another charge…resisting” at about 13:15 and Jorgensen seated in the patrol car within the next minute.
Appellant argues the video and testimony do not show force directed at the officer sufficient for resisting arrest, and that due process requires proof of probation violations beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a preponderance.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Jorgensen)	Held (trial court / posture)
Whether the evidence supports a finding that Jorgensen committed resisting arrest (Tex. Pen. Code § 38.03)	Officer testimony and video show Jorgensen pulled away and resisted handcuffing, supporting revocation	Video shows no force directed at officer; any pulling away was insufficient as a matter of law to establish resisting arrest	Trial court found allegation of resisting arrest true and revoked probation (appellant appeals)
Whether due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt to revoke community supervision	Preponderance standard is constitutionally sufficient for revocation under existing Texas precedent	Due process (Winship principle) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt for revocations that may result in incarceration	Under existing controlling Texas authority (Kelly and subsequent cases until recent developments cited), revocation hearings typically use preponderance; appellant urges this Court to adopt reasonable-doubt standard

Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (§ 38.03 requires force directed at or in opposition to an officer to constitute resisting arrest)
Finley v. State, 484 S.W.3d 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (upholding resisting-arrest conviction where defendant actively pulled against officers’ control)
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (U.S. 1970) (due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt for juvenile adjudications that may result in loss of liberty)
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1972) (due process protections apply to parole revocation)
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (U.S. 1973) (due process protections required for probation revocation proceedings)
Kelly v. State, 483 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (Texas precedent permitting preponderance standard in probation revocation; dissent argued for reasonable-doubt standard)
Ex Parte Doan, 369 S.W.3d 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (rejecting label of revocation hearings as merely administrative and emphasizing enforcement of procedural protections)
Ex Parte Carmona, 185 S.W.3d 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (enumerating due process protections required before final revocation of probation)
Sheehan v. State, 201 S.W.3d 820 (Tex. App.–Waco 2006, no pet.) (passive non-cooperation insufficient to prove use of force for resisting arrest)
Young v. State, 622 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (pulling away from an officer may be insufficient as a matter of law to support resisting-arrest conviction)