Roberson, Crystal Yvette
2013 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1690
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2013Background
- Appellant Crystal Roberson was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; jury found two prior felony convictions true and assessed 30 years’ imprisonment under the habitual-offender statute.
- The indictment’s two enhancement paragraphs were printed in reverse chronological order (alleging a 1991 conviction before a 1989 conviction), creating a facial chronology impossibility.
- At the punishment hearing counsel objected to the enhancement-paragraph sequencing; the court overruled, the prosecutor orally read the priors in correct chronological order, and Roberson pled “true” to both enhancements.
- On direct appeal the First Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the record (penitentiary packets, testimony) established the statutorily required sequence and that Roberson was not misled by the drafting error.
- Roberson sought discretionary review, arguing the court of appeals relied on an unpublished memorandum (Wilson) instead of the published Fourteenth Court opinion Mikel, and invoking Ex parte Rich to argue she could challenge an illegal enhancement despite pleading true.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed: evidence proved the required sequence and the plea of true did not bar review because the record did not affirmatively show an improper enhancement.
Issues
| Issue | Roberson’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence to support second enhancement (sequence requirement under Tex. Penal Code §12.42(d)) | The indictment’s enhancement paragraphs are chronologically impossible (1991 before 1989), so evidence insufficient to support second enhancement and habitual enhancement invalid | The record (penitentiary packets and trial evidence) shows the priors occurred and became final in the required order; pleading true forfeited complaint absent a record affirmatively showing improper enhancement | Evidence was sufficient; priors occurred in required sequence despite drafting error; enhancement upheld |
| Effect of pleading “true” to enhancement paragraphs | Pleading true should not bar challenge where enhancement is factually impossible; cites Ex parte Rich analogy | Pleading true ordinarily forfeits sufficiency challenge unless record affirmatively shows enhancement improper; no such affirmative defect here | Plea of true did not preclude review, but no affirmative record defect existed; Roberson forfeited nothing and claim fails |
| Reliance on unpublished authority (Wilson) vs published Mikel | First COA erroneously relied on unpublished Wilson instead of controlling published Mikel and conflicts with Ex parte Rich rationale | Citing unpublished opinions is permissible with notation; First COA’s citation illustrative and its holding rested on record evidence and governing precedent | No error in citing Wilson; disposition consistent with precedent (including Mikel principles) |
| Notice/prejudice from defective allegation wording | The facial error deprived Roberson of proper notice and may have led to an illegal sentence | Defendant had detailed pretrial notice, objected at trial, was not misled, and prosecutor read priors correctly; no prejudice shown | No prejudice; defendant had adequate notice and opportunity to defend; error immaterial to sufficiency |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. Crim. App.) (plea of true does not bar habeas challenge when record affirmatively shows enhancement was improper)
- Mikel v. State, 167 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.]) (reviewed sufficiency where indictment chronology made required sequencing impossible)
- Jordan v. State, 256 S.W.3d 286 (Tex. Crim. App.) (explaining the four-step chronological proof for §12.42(d) habitual enhancement)
- Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243 (Tex. Crim. App.) (sufficiency assessed by hypothetically correct jury charge)
- Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App.) (principles for measuring evidentiary sufficiency against a hypothetically correct charge)