Robbins, Neal Hampton, WR-73,484-02

Background

Neal Hampton Robbins was convicted largely on expert medical testimony that the child’s death was homicide by asphyxia; Dr. Moore later re-evaluated and concluded the cause and manner of death were “undetermined.”
Robbins sought post-conviction relief arguing the changed expert opinion constituted new "scientific knowledge" under Art. 11.073, Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
In Robbins I the Court denied relief; in Robbins II a majority vacated the conviction, finding Dr. Moore’s later opinion fit within Art. 11.073.
The State moved for rehearing; subsequent events include legislative amendment H.B. 3724 clarifying Art. 11.073 to expressly cover a change in a testifying expert’s scientific knowledge.
Additional developments cited: FBI/DOJ review showing pervasive flaws in past hair-comparison testimony and recent Court habeas grants where medical examiners recanted (Keller), which bolster the view that changed expert opinion can warrant habeas relief.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Art. 11.073 cover a testifying expert’s changed scientific opinion after trial?	Art. 11.073’s plain language and legislative intent cover changes in an expert’s scientific knowledge; Dr. Moore’s re-evaluation qualifies as new scientific knowledge.	The statute targets advances or breakthroughs in a field’s methodology, not individual experts’ hindsight recantations.	Court (majority in Robbins II) held that an expert’s changed, validated scientific opinion can satisfy Art. 11.073; Legislature later codified this view via H.B. 3724.
Was Dr. Moore’s revised opinion sufficiently scientific to be "scientific knowledge" under Art. 11.073?	Moore’s re-evaluation used additional experience, external reviews, and scientific method, qualifying it as scientific knowledge.	State argued re-evaluation is individual opinion change, not a field-wide scientific development.	Held that Moore’s re-evaluation met the statute’s requirements as validated scientific knowledge.
Can legislative history inform ambiguous statutory scope of Art. 11.073?	Legislative history demonstrates the Legislature intended Art. 11.073 to address Robbins-type cases; statute was enacted in response to Robbins I.	State contended history supports a narrower scope focused on generally accepted scientific advances.	Held legislative record supports the broader remedial intent; later amendment (H.B. 3724) reinforces that interpretation.
Do subsequent events (FBI hair-review, Keller habeas grants) bear on statutory interpretation or equitable relief?	These developments show systemic problems with forensic testimony and strengthen the need for Art. 11.073 to encompass individual expert recantations.	State argued such developments do not change the statute’s original meaning regarding scope.	Court and Legislature actions (and Keller grants) were cited as persuasive context supporting relief for Robbins.

Key Cases Cited

Ex parte Neal Hampton Robbins, 360 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (Court denied relief in initial Robbins decision)
Ex parte Henderson, 384 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (addressed changing scientific evidence issues in habeas context)
Ex parte Moussazadeh, 361 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (procedural grounds for habeas reconsideration)
Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (discussed eyewitness identification and reliability concerns)
Winfrey v. State, 323 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (forensic/identification evidence reliability considerations)