Robbins, Neal Hampton
2014 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1900
Tex. Crim. App.2014Background
- Neal Hampton Robbins was convicted in 1999 of capital murder for the death of a 17‑month‑old child and sentenced to life; the State did not seek death.
- At trial the State’s medical‑examiner expert, Dr. Patricia Moore, testified the death was homicide by asphyxia (compression); defense pathology testimony disputed a definitive cause.
- Years later Moore re‑evaluated and amended her opinion to list the cause and manner of death as “undetermined”; other pathologists reached similar uncertainty and the trial judge and some prosecutors recommended a new trial.
- Robbins filed an initial habeas application (denied in 2011) arguing actual innocence/false testimony; no new factual evidence emerged after that filing aside from Moore’s changed opinion.
- In 2013 the Texas Legislature enacted art. 11.073, creating habeas relief where (inter alia) relevant scientific evidence contradicts scientific evidence relied on by the State or was not available at trial; Robbins filed a subsequent application under this new statute.
- The Court held art. 11.073 applies where a state expert’s later scientific opinion contradicts the State’s trial evidence, and on the record found by a preponderance that Robbins would not have been convicted if Moore’s revised opinion had been presented at trial — conviction set aside and new trial ordered.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Robbins could file a subsequent habeas under art. 11.073 | Robbins: art. 11.073 is a new legal basis unavailable at time of his first application; Moore’s re‑evaluation is newly available scientific evidence contradicting State trial evidence | State: no change in general scientific knowledge or methodology; similar defense evidence existed at trial and the claim is not newly ascertainable | Court: art. 11.073 is a new legal basis; Robbins met prima facie requirements to proceed because the State’s trial scientific evidence (Moore’s opinion) was contradicted and that contradiction was not available at trial |
| Whether Moore’s changed opinion qualifies as “scientific knowledge” under art. 11.073(d) | Robbins: Moore’s later, re‑evaluated opinion is scientific (derived from method, validated by experience and review) and thus fits the statute | State: scientific knowledge in statute means advances in the scientific field or methodology, not an individual expert’s change of opinion | Court: Moore’s re‑evaluation qualifies as scientific knowledge for purposes of the statute — an expert’s revised, methodologically grounded opinion can satisfy art. 11.073 |
| Whether the evidence was ascertainable through reasonable diligence before trial or prior application | Robbins: Moore’s re‑evaluation occurred after trial and after his first habeas filing; thus it was not ascertainable earlier | State: the defense presented expert testimony at trial (Dr. Bux) and Moore had been cross‑examined on relevant facts | Court: Moore’s changed State‑side evidence was not ascertainable at trial; it is the State’s evidence that changed and that change matters under art. 11.073 |
| Whether the newly available scientific evidence would probably have changed the outcome | Robbins: Moore was the State’s sole definitive homicide opinion and the State emphasized her testimony; absent it, conviction unlikely | State: other inculpatory evidence remained; re‑evaluation not indisputable | Court: by preponderance, had Moore’s revised opinion been presented, a reasonable probability exists Robbins would not have been convicted; relief granted |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Robbins, 360 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (prior denial of Robbins’s first habeas application addressing medical‑examiner re‑evaluation)
- Ex parte Henderson, 384 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (granting relief where medical‑examiner changed opinion after advances in biomechanics)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (defining "scientific knowledge" and admissibility factors for expert scientific testimony)
- Melendez‑Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (addressing forensic evidence and confrontation clause issues; cited for admissibility context)
- Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (standards for newly discovered evidence in habeas context)
- Ex parte Ghahremani, 332 S.W.3d 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (false testimony as a due‑process habeas ground)
- Ex parte Carmona, 185 S.W.3d 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (discussing effect of changed or false testimony on convictions)