Roake v. Forest Preserve District of Cook County
849 F.3d 342
7th Cir.2017Background
- Brian Roake, a Forest Preserve District of Cook County police officer, attended an off-duty New Year’s Eve celebration at a station where he drank champagne; the department later initiated disciplinary proceedings.
- At an interview Roake was told he might face a one- or two-day suspension; after a pre-disciplinary hearing in February 2014 the hearing officers “upheld the charges,” and Roake resigned, alleging he would have been terminated otherwise.
- Roake contends the alcohol incident was pretextual and that real motive for discipline was retaliation for his internal reports of (1) racial profiling by a fellow officer and (2) what he believed was an unlawful write-up of another officer related to a DCFS report.
- After resigning, Roake alleges Forest Preserve officials told prospective employers he drank on duty and was not welcome to reapply, damaging his reputation and employment prospects.
- Roake sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming First Amendment retaliation and Fourteenth Amendment (procedural due process) reputational injury; the district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a plausible claim, and Roake appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Roake’s internal reports are protected First Amendment speech | Roake says he reported misconduct (racial profiling and improper discipline) and was disciplined in retaliation | Reports were made pursuant to his official duties as a police officer, not as a citizen | Speech was unprotected under Garcetti; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether defendants’ statements about drinking on duty and nonrehire deprived Roake of due process (stigma-plus) | Roake alleges reputational harm that impaired future employment and contends he was effectively removed from the force when charges were upheld | Roake resigned voluntarily; no plausible allegation of constructive discharge or change in legal status | No protected liberty/property interest shown; dismissal affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (public employees’ speech pursuant to official duties is not protected by the First Amendment)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard for plausible claims)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (facial plausibility standard for complaints)
- Spiegla v. Hull, 481 F.3d 961 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal reports of misconduct made pursuant to job duties are not protected speech)
- Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 2016) (determination whether speech is protected is a question of law)
- Vose v. Kliment, 506 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 2007) (officer reporting suspected misconduct was performing job duties)
- Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal complaint about official misconduct was speech pursuant to official duties)
- Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills, 832 F.3d 785 (7th Cir. 2016) (protected speech where reporting extended outside department to outside agency and political corruption)
- Hinkle v. White, 793 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2015) (reputational injury alone is insufficient for due process; stigma-plus required)
- Willan v. Columbia County, 280 F.3d 1160 (7th Cir. 2002) (mere reputational injury not a protected liberty interest)
- Santana v. Cook County Board of Review, 679 F.3d 614 (7th Cir. 2012) (defamatory statements actionable under Fourteenth Amendment only if they alter legal status)
- Lifton v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 416 F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 2005) (constructive discharge for due process purposes limited to egregious cases)
- Witte v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections, 434 F.3d 1031 (7th Cir. 2006) (working conditions threshold for constructive discharge higher than for hostile work environment)