Roach v. Ingram
557 S.W.3d 203
Tex. App.2018Background
- Parents Roach and Brady sued Fort Bend County officials, FBISD trustees, Juvenile Board judges, and others alleging an unauthorized "Truancy Court" and widespread ultra vires and due-process violations in criminal truancy enforcement.
- Plaintiffs sought declaratory and prospective injunctive relief (no money damages) and class certification; attorneys Harrington, Soto, Anhalt, and Isgitt represented them.
- After plaintiffs filed suit, FBISD suspended referrals and the Legislature decriminalized truancy (HB 2398), expunging prior criminal truancy records; the individual truancy complaints against the plaintiffs’ children were dismissed.
- Defendants filed a mix of TCPA motions, Rule 91a motions, pleas to the jurisdiction, and requests for sanctions/attorney’s fees. Plaintiffs filed an improper “counter-TCPA” motion in response.
- The trial court dismissed the suit, granted TCPA/91a pleas and pleas to the jurisdiction as applicable, denied plaintiffs’ counter-TCPA motion, and awarded substantial sanctions and attorney’s fees against the parents and their attorneys.
- On appeal the court affirmed in all respects: judgment not void, no disqualification, TCPA applicable to officials in official capacity, plaintiffs failed to meet TCPA prima facie burden, claims against many defendants moot or without basis, and sanctions were supported and not excessive.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Final judgment void because interlocutory TCPA appeal stayed trial court | Premature notice of interlocutory appeal stayed proceedings; judgment signed during stay is void | A judgment signed during a statutory stay is voidable, not void; no timely trial-court objection was made | Overruled — judgment not void; error waived for lack of timely objection |
| 2. Judge disqualification (Judge Elliott) | Judge Elliott, as Juvenile Board member, had a personal/pecuniary interest and should be disqualified | Naming a judge or related official standing alone is insufficient; interest must be direct and immediate | Overruled — plaintiffs failed to show a disqualifying direct pecuniary or personal interest |
| 3. Counter-TCPA motion allowable | Plaintiffs: TCPA "legal action" includes motions; counter-TCPA was proper | Defendants: "Legal action" refers to claims/pleadings that vindicate a claim; countermotion to dismiss not covered | Overruled — TCPA does not authorize a countermotion to dismiss; counter-TCPA improper (agreeing with Paulsen) |
| 4. TCPA applicable to government officials sued in official capacity | Plaintiffs: applying TCPA to officials would eviscerate ultra vires suits | Defendants: TCPA text covers communications on matters of public concern by officials; statute controls | Held — TCPA may apply to government officials in official capacity; communications about truancy were protected |
| 5. Judicial Defs' TCPA dismissal (ultra vires claims) | Plaintiffs: produced clear and specific evidence of ultra vires acts by Juvenile Board | Defendants: claims target communications/votes and thus fall within TCPA; plaintiffs produced no clear, specific prima facie evidence | Overruled — Judicial Defs met burden; plaintiffs failed to establish prima facie ultra vires claims |
| 6. Pleas to jurisdiction by FBISD & County (mootness/standing) | Plaintiffs: decriminalization does not moot prospective relief because violations could recur under civil system | Defendants: legislative overhaul decriminalized prior system and expunged records; challenged conduct cannot reasonably recur | Held — claims as to past criminal-truancy scheme moot; pleas to jurisdiction properly granted |
| 7. Rule 91a dismissal (Dobbs) | Plaintiffs: Dobbs had role in scheme; claims viable | Dobbs: pleadings lack factual allegations showing he acted without authority; no basis in law or fact | Overruled — Dobbs' Rule 91a granted; plaintiffs failed to plead specific ultra vires acts by Dobbs |
| 8. Class certification denial | Plaintiffs: trial court failed to timely consider Rule 42 | Defendants: timing was within trial-court discretion; merits dismissed so class certification irrelevant | Held — denial not error after dismissal of all claims |
| 9–12. Sanctions (basis, amount, explanation, appellate fees) | Plaintiffs: sanctions unsupported, inadequately explained, excessive, and appellate-fee award unenforceable | Defendants: pleadings and conduct were frivolous; plaintiffs persisted after mootness and warnings; sanctions tailored to deter and reimburse fees; issues insufficiently briefed/preserved | Held — sanctions and fee awards supported; specificity objection waived; amounts not excessive; appellate-fee complaint waived |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015) (explaining TCPA purpose and procedures)
- Roccaforte v. Jefferson County, 341 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. 2011) (a judgment during a stay is voidable and complainant must timely object)
- Paulsen v. Yarrell, 537 S.W.3d 224 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017) (TCPA does not treat a countermotion to dismiss as a "legal action")
- Texas Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (standards for plea to the jurisdiction and justiciability)
- Matthews ex rel. M.M. v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 416 (Tex. 2016) (voluntary cessation and mootness; test whether challenged conduct could reasonably recur)
- Nath v. Texas Children's Hospital, 446 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. 2014) (standards on sanctions: nexus, proportionality, and due process)
- Zeifman v. Nowlin, 322 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010) (affirming substantial sanctions under Rule 13)
