Rmg Worldwide Llc., Et Ano v. Pierce County, 409 P.3d 1126

Background

LeMay applied in Feb 1990 for a Classic Estates PDD/rezone and concurrently was advised by Pierce County to instead seek an Unclassified Use Permit (UP) to open a golf course more quickly.
On June 26, 1990 LeMay applied for UP9‑90 (golf course). The hearing examiner approved UP9‑90 (Oct 1990); that decision was not appealed. LeMay recorded covenant conditions and later obtained a major amendment (1991) to UP9‑90 approving a 96‑lot preliminary subdivision adjacent to the golf course; final plat was approved in 1998.
After GMA and Pierce County’s 1994 comprehensive plan, the property was rezoned from General Use to Rural Reserve (outside UGA). Lot 2 (the golf course) remained rural.
RMG purchased the golf course parcel (Lot 2) in 2005 and repeatedly sought to have the parcel moved into the UGA/rezoned for urban density; those efforts failed.
In 2014 RMG asked the County to process a major amendment to UP9‑90 under the 1990 zoning; County said any new subdivision must meet current Rural Reserve rules. RMG also asked to revive the 1990 PDD/rezone. The hearing examiner (2014, 2015) denied both requests, finding UP9‑90 did not rezone the land and the 1990 PDD/rezone had been abandoned. Superior court affirmed; appellate court affirmed and awarded fees to County.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether UP9‑90 or the 1991 major amendment rezoned the entire 157‑acre parcel or vested residential density for the golf parcel	RMG: the 1991 amendment/UP approvals effectively rezoned or vested the entire property (including Lot 2) at the 96‑lot density	County: UP approvals do not amend zoning maps; the 1991 approval was a subdivision approval under UP9‑90, not a PDD/rezone; subsequent rezoning to Rural Reserve controls	Held: UP9‑90 and the 1991 amendment did not rezone the property or vest urban densities; any new subdivision must comply with current Rural Reserve zoning
Whether the original 1990 PDD/rezone application remained pending or was abandoned	RMG: the 1990 PDD/rezone remained viable; County cannot treat it as abandoned after decades	County: LeMay elected to pursue a UP instead, used UP9‑90 and later subdivision procedures, never pursued PDD; long inaction and conduct show abandonment; finality doctrine applies	Held: substantial evidence supports abandonment; application was abandoned and RMG cannot revive it
Whether a PDD/rezone application vests as a vested right such that later zoning changes cannot apply	RMG: vested rights attach to its 1990 application	County: vested‑rights statute covers only building permits, subdivisions, and development agreements; PDD/rezone not statutorily vested	Held: PDD/rezone applications do not receive statutory vesting here; the application would be subject to current zoning even if not abandoned
Entitlement to equitable servitude or covenant creating development right	RMG: recorded covenant (conditions for UP9‑90) creates an equitable servitude entitling future residential densities	County: recorded covenant only memorialized golf course conditions; it did not grant residential zoning entitlements	Held: covenant did not create a zoning entitlement or vest residential density rights

Key Cases Cited

Phoenix Dev., Inc. v. City of Woodinville, 171 Wn.2d 820 (2011) (LUPA is exclusive method for judicial review of land use decisions)
Abbey Rd. Grp., LLC v. City of Bonney Lake, 167 Wn.2d 242 (2009) (plaintiff bears burden under RCW 36.70C.130 to establish LUPA relief standards)
Durland v. San Juan County, 182 Wn.2d 55 (2014) (finality and prompt challenges in land use matters under GMA and LUPA)
Skamania County v. Gorge Comm’n, 144 Wn.2d 30 (2001) (importance of certainty and finality in land use appeals)
Town of Woodway v. Snohomish County, 180 Wn.2d 165 (2014) (statutory nature and limits of vested rights doctrine)
Maranatha Min., Inc. v. Pierce County, 59 Wn. App. 795 (1990) (scope and purpose of unclassified use permits in Pierce County)