462 F.Supp.3d 203
E.D.N.Y2020Background
- On August 3, 2013, ADA Jacqueline Rizk and NYPD Detective Samir Gonsalves had a loud, physical dispute after leaving a Queens bar; two officers (Lee and Mehirdel) were alerted by a motorist and pedestrians and encountered the couple on the street.
- Officers approached; facts diverge: Mehirdel says Gonsalves poked him in the chest and Rizk struck him in the back; plaintiffs deny making contact. A surveillance video captures the incident but is low quality and inconclusive on the pivotal touch/strike issues.
- Officers attempted to handcuff Gonsalves (he produced NYPD ID later), then placed Rizk in a patrol car; both were taken to the precinct, charged, released on recognizance, and charges were later dismissed.
- Plaintiffs sued the City, NYPD, and Individual Defendants asserting §1983 claims (false arrest, excessive force, fabrication/fair trial, conspiracy, failure to intervene), §1985/§1986 claims, and multiple state-law torts. Plaintiffs later withdrew Monell and malicious prosecution claims and all claims against Lt. Howley.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment. The Court (Mauskopf, C.J.) granted summary judgment in part and denied it in part on May 22, 2020: several claims and defendants dismissed, but key §1983 false-arrest and excessive-force/fair-trial claims survived against Officer Mehirdel and some excessive-force/failure-to-intervene claims survived against Officer Lee; City and NYPD were dismissed as non‑suable/Monell withdrawn.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a §1983 claim can be predicated solely on violations of police policies/protocols | Rizk/Gonsalves alleged defendants failed to follow policies, which violated rights | Defendants: policy violations are not themselves constitutional violations | Dismissed: §1983 does not redress mere policy breaches absent constitutional violation |
| False arrest / false imprisonment (probable cause) | Plaintiffs: no probable cause; officers fabricated facts (pokes/strikes) | Defendants: initial stop justified by reasonable suspicion; probable cause arose when Gonsalves contacted Mehirdel and when Rizk interfered; parking violation argument | Denied as to plaintiffs: genuine fact disputes (contact, knowledge of car ownership) preclude summary judgment for defendants |
| Excessive force (Fourth Amendment) | Plaintiffs: handcuffing and removal from car were excessive; injuries and video support claim | Defendants: force used was reasonable to effect arrest; some uses de minimis; video disproves claims | Partially granted/partially denied: excessive-force claims survive against Mehirdel and (as to Gonsalves) Lee; dismissed as to Sgt. Rosenthal and Rizk’s claim vs Lee; factual disputes preclude qualified immunity resolution |
| Fair‑trial fabrication (fabricating evidence forwarded to prosecutors) | Plaintiffs: Mehirdel fabricated that Gonsalves shoved him and that Rizk struck him, and provided this to prosecutors | Defendants: video disproves fabrication; only Mehirdel implicated | Survives against Mehirdel only: video inconclusive; other defendants dismissed for lack of personal involvement |
| Conspiracy (§1983 and §1985) | Plaintiffs: officers agreed to seize, arrest, and fabricate evidence | Defendants: intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars claims; no class-based animus for §1985 | Dismissed: intracorporate doctrine applies; §1985 also fails for lack of class-based animus and no meeting of minds |
| Failure to intervene (§1983 and §1986) | Plaintiffs: some officers failed to stop unconstitutional conduct they observed | Defendants: officers either participated directly or reasonably believed no violation occurred; §1986 depends on §1985 | §1983 failure‑to‑intervene claims survive in part (pleaded in alternative); §1986 dismissed as §1985 failed |
| State-law torts (fraud, negligence, IIED, NIED, respondeat superior) | Plaintiffs: state claims arise from same facts (false arrest, excessive force, fabrication) | Defendants: fraud inadequately pleaded; negligence inconsistent with intentional-tort allegations; IIED/NIED deficient | Fraud and negligence/NIED dismissed; IIED survives against Mehirdel only; respondeat superior survives tied to remaining viable tort claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2010) (elements of a §1983 claim and state‑actor discussion)
- Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999) (under‑color‑of‑state‑law principle)
- Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2007) (probable cause is a complete defense to false arrest)
- Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 1996) (probable‑cause standard for arrests)
- United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659 (2d Cir. 2004) (least‑intrusive‑means principle for investigatory stops)
- Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (limits on investigatory stops and force)
- Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1997) (elements of a fabrication/fair‑trial §1983 claim)
- Garnett v. Undercover Officer C0039, 838 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2016) (clarifies Ricciuti fabrication standard)
- Fed. Ins. Co. v. United States, 882 F.3d 348 (2d Cir. 2018) (intra‑corporate conspiracy doctrine application)
- Sloley v. VanBramer, 945 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2019) (duty of officers to intervene to protect constitutional rights)
- United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983) (elements for §1985 conspiracy claim)
- Bender v. City of New York, 78 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 1996) (IIED may lie when officers assault and then file false charges)