Rivko Knox v. Mark Brnovich, 907 F.3d 1167

Background

Arizona enacted H.B. 2023 (2016), a felony prohibition on knowingly collecting another person’s voted or unvoted early ballot, with statutory exemptions for family/household members and caregivers and an express exemption for election officials, U.S. Postal Service workers, or any person "allowed by law to transmit United States mail" when engaged in official duties.
Plaintiff Rivko Knox, a long-time Democratic precinct committeeperson and canvasser, had previously collected and delivered voted early ballots for voters who requested help and says that collecting/delivering ballots is part of her political expression; after H.B. 2023 she curtailed that activity out of fear of prosecution.
Knox filed suit challenging H.B. 2023 facially on three grounds: (1) preemption by federal postal laws (Private Express Statutes and related regulations), (2) violation of the First Amendment (expressive conduct/speech), and (3) vagueness under the Due Process Clause.
The district court denied preliminary injunctive relief and rejected all three claims; Knox appealed. The Ninth Circuit reviewed legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error and affirmed.
The Ninth Circuit held: H.B. 2023 is not preempted by federal postal statutes/regulations, does not implicate First Amendment protected expressive conduct in this context, and is not unconstitutionally vague.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Preemption by Private Express Statutes	Knox: federal postal monopoly/regulations implicitly preempt H.B. 2023 (field or conflict preemption), because federal law governs carriage of letters and authorizes certain private/uncompensated carriage exempt from postal monopoly.	Brnovich/State: Private Express Statutes target carriage for hire and competitors; uncompensated carriage is not in the occupied federal field and Arizona law exempts postal employees, so no conflict or field preemption.	No preemption: presumption against preemption applies; federal statutes regulate competitors for hire, not uncompensated collectors, and H.B. 2023 does not conflict with federal objectives.
First Amendment (expressive conduct)	Knox: collecting/delivering ballots is expressive political conduct conveying support for voting-by-mail and facilitating enfranchisement; law chills protected speech.	State: collecting/delivering another’s ballot is not inherently communicative conduct; law regulates conduct (possession/collection), not speech; analogies to mail-sender speech or contribution limits are inapposite.	No First Amendment violation: plaintiff failed to show ballot collection is conduct reasonably understood as expressive speech; statute does not meaningfully restrict political communication.
Vagueness / Due Process	Knox: statutory exemptions ("any other person allowed by law to transmit United States mail"; "engaged in official duties") are unclear and could be read so broadly as to render the law meaningless or invite arbitrary enforcement.	State: statute gives ordinary persons fair notice; exemptions read naturally to cover persons with official mail-delivery duties; similar statutory language has been upheld; precinct committeeperson duties don't reasonably qualify as "election official" for this exemption.	Not vague: statute provides fair notice and does not encourage arbitrary enforcement; exemptions are sufficiently clear in ordinary usage.
Scope of relief / Facial challenge standard	Knox sought facial invalidation (no circumstances in which law would be valid).	State argued statute validly applies in many circumstances and passes constitutional review.	Denied facial relief: challenger failed to meet Salerno/Puente standard showing no set of valid applications.

Key Cases Cited

Air Courier Conference of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union AFL-CIO, 498 U.S. 517 (discusses scope and history of postal monopoly and Congressional purpose)
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589 (clarifies private-hands exception and limits of postal monopoly)
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (presumption against preemption; congressional intent controls)
Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (framework for express, field, and conflict preemption analysis)
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (identifies areas with manifest federal interest where presumption against preemption is diminished)
Salerno v. United States, 481 U.S. 739 (standard for facial challenges: no set of circumstances where statute would be valid)
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (tests for expressive conduct under the First Amendment)
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (limits on labeling conduct as protected speech)
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (political expenditure speech principles referenced in First Amendment analogies)
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (delivery/disclosure of information as protected speech in narrow circumstances)