337 P.3d 1076
Wash.2014Background
- In the 1980s Spencer and Livingston developed Deer Meadows/Deer Heights near Lake Roosevelt, building a golf-course complex and selling residential lots marketed as part of a golf-course community.
- Many purchasers claim they relied on developers’ representations that the golf course would remain a permanent community amenity; some purchasers formed Riverview Community Group to enforce those expectations.
- Riverview sued to impose an equitable servitude on the former golf-course parcel (to limit its use to a golf course) and sought injunctive relief; defendants moved to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties and for summary judgment arguing that equitable servitudes must be created in writing.
- The trial court dismissed and granted summary judgment on the novel legal question; the Court of Appeals reversed in part but affirmed on the ground that forcing operation of a failing golf course would be irrational.
- The Washington Supreme Court granted review, held Riverview has organizational standing, held equitable servitudes may be implied under Washington law (following Johnson), reversed the dismissal, and remanded for further proceedings to determine facts and appropriate equitable relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Organizational standing / real party in interest | Riverview may sue for its members’ interests; members have standing, purpose is germane, and relief (equitable servitude/injunction) does not require individual participation | Riverview lacks standing; individual homeowners are indispensable and Riverview was formed after the events to avoid individual suits | Riverview has organizational standing; CR17/CR19 dismissal was unwarranted and individual owners are not indispensable |
| Availability of implied equitable servitude | An equitable servitude can be implied from developers’ representations (per Restatement §2.10 or Johnson); equitable relief is appropriate to prevent injustice | Servitudes must be created in writing; statute of frauds and parol-evidence/dead-man’s rules bar relief | Washington recognizes implied equitable servitudes under Johnson; statute of frauds is not a bar to equitable relief when writings (e.g., plats, advertising) and conduct support imposition |
| Sufficiency of Riverview’s evidence at summary judgment | Oral assurances, plats labeling a golf course, marketing materials, and members’ declarations create material factual disputes | Evidence is insufficient: no deed or consistent plat restriction, merger clauses, and lack of written common plan under Johnson | Court found Riverview presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on the question whether those with power to burden the property induced reliance; factual issues remain for trial/remand |
| Appropriate equitable remedy (e.g., forced operation) | If an implied servitude is established, courts may fashion equitable relief (servitude, injunction) tailored to avoid injustice | Forcing defendants to operate an unprofitable golf course is inequitable and may be impractical | Whether to impose specific injunctive remedies (e.g., requiring operation) is a fact-sensitive question left to the trial court on remand; the appellate dismissal on the ground it would be irrational was reversed |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. Mt. Baker Presbyterian Church, 113 Wash. 458 (Wash. 1920) (recognized equitable relief to enforce developer representations and allowed implied servitude)
- Hollis v. Garwall, Inc., 137 Wn.2d 683 (Wash. 1999) (plat language can support equitable covenants)
- 1515-1519 Lakeview Boulevard Condo. Ass’n v. Apt. Sales Corp., 146 Wn.2d 194 (Wash. 2002) (covenants can be enforced against parties without covenants on title)
- Mountain High Homeowners Ass’n v. J.L. Ward Co., 228 Or. App. 424 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (imposed equitable servitude on golf-course property based on developer representations; adopted Restatement approach)
- Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 1789 v. Spokane Airports, 146 Wn.2d 207 (Wash. 2002) (association standing test for suing on behalf of members)
- Anderson v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., 172 Wn.2d 593 (Wash. 2011) (standard of review for summary judgment)