Riverdale Mills Corp. v. Cavatorta North America, Inc.
189 F. Supp. 3d 317
D. Mass.2016Background
- Riverdale Mills (plaintiff) sued Metallurgica Abruzzese SPA and Cavatorta North America (defendants) alleging false advertising and unfair competition for marketing SEAPLAX as galvanized-after-weld (GAW) when some shipments were galvanized-before-weld (GBW).
- After Riverdale obtained a preliminary injunction requiring accurate labeling, Metallurgica and Cavatorta asserted counterclaims alleging tortious interference with business relations and Chapter 93A violations based on Riverdale’s emails to certain Cavatorta customers.
- The emails, sent by Riverdale’s sales VP, attached excerpts of defendants’ opposition papers and affidavits; most recipients already knew of the dispute; only two were later subpoenaed.
- Emails included statements asserting defendants sold mislabeled/defective product and that traps were failing; defendants allege Riverdale knowingly contacted customers to induce termination of business and acted with malice.
- Riverdale moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (insufficiency of pleadings and litigation privilege) and separately under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 59H (anti‑SLAPP special motion).
- The court denied the anti‑SLAPP motions but granted the Rule 12(b)(6) motions, dismissing the counterclaims without prejudice for failure to allege actual harm and giving leave to amend.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Riverdale’s emails are protected by the litigation privilege | Emails were communications pertinent to the litigation (referenced suit, attached pleadings, warned of subpoenas) and thus privileged | Emails were unnecessary, gratuitous communications to non‑parties meant to harm defendants and were not pertinent to litigation | Emails not covered by litigation privilege (more like public/extra‑judicial publicity than protected litigation communications) |
| Whether counterclaims plead tortious interference with business relations | Counterclaims insufficient because privileged and/or fail to plead required elements | Defendants alleged knowledge, intentional interference, and harm from contacting their customers | Tortious interference dismissed for failure to plead actual harm (no allegation of lost customers or sales) |
| Whether counterclaims state a Chapter 93A claim | Chapter 93A claims fail for same reason—lack of pleaded harm | Defendants allege unfair competition and consumer‑facing misrepresentations caused harm | Chapter 93A claims dismissed for failure to plead actual injury (harm element required) |
| Whether anti‑SLAPP statute (Mass. ch. 231, § 59H) bars the counterclaims | Emails are petitioning activity (statements in connection with judicial proceeding; informing of subpoenas) so special motion to dismiss should apply | Emails had commercial motive and targeted competitors’ customers; not petitioning activity | Anti‑SLAPP motions denied: court finds emails have a strong commercial character and are not exclusively petitioning activity |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: factual allegations must make claims plausible)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading standard requiring more than labels and conclusions)
- Encompass Ins. Co. of Mass. v. Giampa, 522 F. Supp. 2d 300 (D. Mass. 2007) (litigation privilege does not protect unnecessary extra‑judicial publications)
- Loomis v. Tulip, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D. Mass. 1998) (privilege applies where communications are inextricably tied to litigation needs)
- Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 448 Mass. 242 (2007) (communications with commercial motive are not petitioning activity under anti‑SLAPP)
- Wynne v. Creigle, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 246 (2005) (repetition of statements made in formal proceedings may retain petitioning character)
- Kimmel & Silverman, P.C. v. Porro, 53 F. Supp. 3d 325 (D. Mass. 2014) (examples where privilege applied to filings and court‑directed submissions)
- Mack v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 664 (2015) (application of litigation privilege requires fact‑specific analysis)