Rivera v. Thompson, 879 F.3d 7

Background

Rivera was tried in Massachusetts for stabbing Robert Williams; convicted of armed assault with intent to murder, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and assault on a public employee.
Officer Sistrand encountered Rivera moments after a 911 call, drew his gun, ordered Rivera to the ground while Rivera was bleeding; Sistrand asked express questions on the street without Miranda warnings.
Rivera responded that he "had a beef" and had been "disrespected," using a racial slur; those statements were admitted at trial and used to argue Rivera's culpable intent.
Trial counsel did not move to suppress Rivera’s roadside statements but did seek suppression of other evidence; counsel also promised third-party perpetrator evidence in opening which was not presented at trial.
On postconviction review, Massachusetts courts denied Rivera’s ineffective-assistance claims on the performance prong; Rivera sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The First Circuit held that counsel’s failure to move to suppress the custodial, express questioning statements violated Strickland and AEDPA; it reversed and ordered the writ be granted.

Issues

Issue	Rivera's Argument	Thompson's Argument	Held
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to suppress statements made to Officer Sistrand on the street	Counsel's failure to move to suppress was objectively unreasonable because the questioning was custodial interrogation under Miranda	Counsel reasonably could have thought Miranda did not apply (not in custody; or questions were non-interrogative/routine booking)	Held: Counsel's failure was deficient; Massachusetts court unreasonably applied Miranda/Innis; AEDPA deference does not save it
Whether Sistrand's street questions constituted "interrogation" under Miranda/Innis	Rivera: Express questions ("what are you doing?", "why?") while in custody are interrogation requiring warnings	Respondent: questions were preliminary/introductory or akin to booking questions and thus not interrogation	Held: Questions were express interrogation under Innis; routine-booking exception inapplicable
Whether the deficient performance was prejudicial under Strickland (i.e., reasonable probability of different outcome)	Rivera: Statements were critical evidence of intent/malice and undermined self-defense/mitigation, likely affected verdict	Respondent: Statements only confirmed involvement in a fight (already conceded/established) so no prejudice	Held: Prejudice shown as statements materially bore on intent/malice and self-defense; undermines confidence in verdict
Standard of review under AEDPA when state court reached only performance prong	Rivera: Because state court decided only performance, prejudice prong reviewed de novo; performance must pass AEDPA deferential standard	Respondent: State decision was reasonable under AEDPA/Strickland	Held: State court's performance conclusion was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law; therefore relief warranted

Key Cases Cited

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (custodial interrogation requires warnings)
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (interrogation includes express questioning and words/actions reasonably likely to elicit incriminating response)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (two-prong ineffective assistance standard: performance and prejudice)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (AEDPA deference and standard for unreasonable application)
Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (custody inquiry: whether freedom deprived in significant way)
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (routine booking exception to Miranda for biographical data)
Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (counsel ineffective only when no competent attorney would have chosen that strategy)
United States v. Downing, 665 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1981) (express questioning in custody constitutes interrogation)