Rivera v. Orange County Probation Department (In Re Rivera)
832 F.3d 1103
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Maria Rivera’s minor son was held in Orange County juvenile detention 2008–2010; the Probation Department billed Rivera under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 903 for limited daily costs (cap $30/day) and legal expenses, totaling about $16,372.
- Rivera paid $9,508 after selling her house; a default judgment later recorded a remaining debt of about $9,905.
- Rivera filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy (Sept. 2011) and received a discharge (Jan. 2012); she listed the county claim as unsecured, not a domestic support obligation (DSO).
- Orange County continued collection, claiming the debt was a nondischargeable DSO under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) as amended by BAPCPA.
- Bankruptcy court and Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held for the County; Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the detention-cost debt is not a DSO and therefore dischargeable.
Issues
| Issue | Rivera’s Argument | Orange County’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether parent’s debt for child’s juvenile-detention costs is a "domestic support obligation" (DSO) under 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)/§ 523(a)(5) | Debt is unsecured consumer debt dischargeable in Chapter 7; county never objected to classification as unsecured in bankruptcy | Debt is “in the nature of support” because charges are for the child’s food, clothing, medicine and state law limits recoverable items to those support-like items; BAPCPA permits government creditors to hold DSOs | Reversed: debt is not a DSO because juvenile detention is corrective/public-safety, not part of the government’s family-support infrastructure; costs incidental to incarceration are not "in the nature of support." |
Key Cases Cited
- Harris v. Viegelahn, 135 S. Ct. 1829 (2015) (discussing bankruptcy discharge and the debtor’s fresh start)
- Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365 (2007) (Bankruptcy Code’s principal purpose is a fresh start for honest debtors)
- Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754 (2013) (exceptions to discharge construed narrowly; require clear congressional intent)
- DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (state’s duty to provide for incarcerated persons arises from custodial restriction of liberty)
- In re Leibowitz, 217 F.3d 799 (9th Cir. 2000) (debt ‘‘in the nature of support’’ analysis focuses on nature of debt, not identity of payee)
- In re Chang, 163 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 1998) (court-appointed costs tied to custody proceedings can be DSOs when they serve domestic-support purposes)
- In re Platter, 140 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 1998) (parent’s juvenile custody-related reimbursement is dischargeable where purpose is reimbursement, not child support)