Rita Solon v. United States, 196 A.3d 1283

Rita Solon was convicted after a bench trial of disorderly conduct under D.C. Code § 22-1321(a)(1) for walking with a Trump sign and repeatedly attempting to push into a linked-semicircle of march participants at a People’s Climate Movement event.
Video admitted by stipulation showed Solon pacing with a flag, attempting to insert herself into the locked-arm line, at times coming within a foot or two of participants; march marshals and staff walked near her.
Witnesses described Solon as making “woo-woo” noises, using elbows to push or ram, stepping on a marshal’s arm earlier, and spitting (the court acquitted on assault/spitting counts).
The trial court convicted Solon under § 22-1321(a)(1), reasoning the government need not prove that any actual person was in fear, only that a person of reasonable sensibility would have been placed in fear.
On appeal, Solon argued § 22-1321(a)(1) requires proof that another person was actually placed in reasonable fear and that the evidence was insufficient; the D.C. Court of Appeals agreed and reversed and entered acquittal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does § 22-1321(a)(1) require proof that an actual person was placed in fear?	Solon: statute requires proof someone was actually caused to be in reasonable fear.	Government: statute can be satisfied by showing a reasonable person would have been placed in fear (objective test).	The court held the statute requires proof that another person was actually placed in reasonable fear.
Was the trial court’s contrary legal interpretation harmless error?	Solon: not harmless because evidence did not show anyone was actually placed in fear.	Government: trial court’s factual findings could support conviction under an objective standard.	Error was not harmless; court reversed because evidence insufficient under the correct standard.
Was there sufficient evidence that anyone was actually placed in fear?	Solon: witnesses and video show no actual fear; faces were impassive; some laughed; police present.	Government: testimony that Solon’s conduct was “scary” and that marshals recoiled supports fear.	Court: evidence did not show that persons were in actual reasonable fear; conviction cannot stand.
Should case be remanded for reconsideration under correct legal standard?	Solon: seeks acquittal given insufficiency.	Government: implicit request for remand to re-evaluate under correct standard.	Court ordered entry of judgment of acquittal rather than remand.

Mitchell v. United States, 977 A.2d 959 (D.C. 2009) (de novo review of statutory construction).
Walker v. United States, 167 A.3d 1191 (D.C. 2017) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence).
Brooks v. United States, 130 A.3d 952 (D.C. 2016) (sufficiency-of-evidence standard; obligation to require persuasive proof).
Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125 (D.C. 2001) (en banc) (importance of persuasive evidence beyond a reasonable doubt).
Robinson v. United States, 506 A.2d 572 (D.C. 1986) (intent-to-frighten assault requires intent to create apprehension).
Ackerson v. City of White Plains, 702 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 2012) (interpreting similar statutory language to require actual statement of feeling threatened).
United States v. Gilmore, 282 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2002) (applying objective-test approach to intimidation language in federal bank robbery statute).
United States v. Alsop, 479 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1973) (objective ordinary-person standard for intimidation).