Rita Johnson v. Timothy Morales
946 F.3d 911
| 6th Cir. | 2020Background
- Rita Johnson owns Rita’s Southern Soul Café in Saginaw, Michigan; unknown persons unaffiliated with her restaurant fired multiple shots into the restaurant during a rented private event.
- City Manager Timothy Morales issued an immediate suspension of Johnson’s business license under Saginaw Code § 110.06(F) (public health, morals, safety, welfare) and ordered a show-cause hearing three days later.
- Dennis Jordan (Human Resources Director) served as the initial hearing officer and upheld the suspension; an appeal panel later affirmed.
- Johnson sued the City, Morales, and Jordan alleging multiple constitutional violations (procedural and substantive due process, equal protection/class-of-one, vagueness, selective enforcement, ex parte communications, and recusal conflicts).
- The district court dismissed the complaint and denied leave to amend; the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded certain claims for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Jordan’s role as hearing officer (his immediate supervisor Morales issued suspension) created unconstitutional risk of bias (command influence) | Johnson: subordinates cannot be neutral when reviewing an immediate boss’s enforcement decision | City: agency adjudication by officials and their subordinates is permissible; no extreme facts like investigator/prosecutor/witness combined | Court: No unconstitutional risk of bias; Jordan’s participation did not require recusal (claim dismissed) |
| Whether Jordan should have recused because City attorney representing him previously appeared in unrelated suit | Johnson: prior representation by City attorney of Jordan created bias | City: prior representation was remote, unrelated, and insufficient to disqualify | Court: No due-process violation; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether due process required a pre-suspension hearing before immediate license suspension under §110.06(F) | Johnson: suspension deprived property interest without adequate pre-deprivation process | City: immediate action was justified by public-safety interests and prompt post-deprivation hearing suffices | Court: Mathews balancing favors requiring some pre-suspension process here; plaintiff plausibly stated a procedural due-process claim (reversed & remanded) |
| Whether §110.06 shifts burden to licensee at post-suspension show-cause hearing in violation of due process | Johnson: ordinance makes licensee prove innocence after emergency suspension, creating unfair presumption | City: burden-shifting in civil/quasi-judicial contexts is generally permissible; ordinance allows manager to act for cause | Court: Majority finds as-applied burden-shifting claim plausible and reverses dismissal; a judge dissents that facial challenge fails but majority outcome reverses on as-applied basis |
| Whether appeal-panel composition, lack of legal training, absence of stated standard, and no written reasons violated due process (§110.06(E)) | Johnson: panelists were non-detached, lacked legal competence, had unlimited discretion, and failed to provide reasons | City: ordinance provides meaningful opportunity to be heard, ability to present evidence/argument, and written decision was mailed; no constitutional-level procedural deficits | Court: Ordinance’s appellate procedures provided minimum due process; claim dismissed |
| Whether §110.06(F) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to suspension after shooting | Johnson: terms like "public health, morals, safety, welfare" are too vague and grant unchecked discretion | City: language is common in municipal regulations and economic regulations get more leniency; facts (shooting) give notice | Court: Not unconstitutionally vague as applied; statute upheld for this factual context |
| Whether selective enforcement / equal protection (class-of-one) claim was adequately pleaded | Johnson: City suspended her license but not others after similar shootings; no rational basis for different treatment | City: decisions are discretionary and may be based on differing facts (gang-relatedness, number of shooters, venue context) | Court: Majority finds class-of-one claim plausible as alleged and reverses denial of leave to amend; dissent questions cognizability and plausibility given discretionary policing decisions |
| Whether alleged ex parte communications between Jordan and Police Chief Ruth violated due process | Johnson: Jordan had secret communications about her case, depriving her of confrontation and fairness | City: communications were minimal, investigatory in nature, and plaintiff alleged no prejudice; she had opportunity to cross-examine at hearing | Court: No due-process violation shown by the attached communications; claim dismissed |
| Whether suspension based on third-party criminal acts violates substantive due process (arbitrary and capricious) | Johnson: suspending her license because of crimes by unaffiliated third parties is arbitrary, lacks rational basis, and shocks the conscience | City: suspension was rationally related to protecting public health and safety given violent, possibly gang-related shooting at the premises | Court: Majority holds plaintiff plausibly alleged the City lacked a rational basis and reverses denial of leave to amend on substantive-due-process claim; dissent argues action had factual basis and does not meet extreme-arbitrary standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016) (objective test for risk of judicial bias)
- Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (presumption of adjudicator neutrality; executive/adjudicative function blending)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (three-factor balancing test for what process is due)
- Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (property interest in employment and pre-termination hearing requirement)
- Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (1997) (temporary suspension without pre-hearing may be permissible given prompt postsuspension hearing)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (due process in parole-revocation hearings; confrontation considerations)
- Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (class-of-one equal-protection doctrine)
- Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591 (2008) (limits on class-of-one in public-employment/discretionary contexts)
- Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1992) (substantive-due-process standard: irrational or willful/unreasoning action)
- United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 768 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2014) (license is a protected property interest; due-process analysis)
- Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (burden of persuasion default rules in civil/quasi-judicial settings)
- Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (invalidating burden-shifting where it risks erroneous deprivation and implicates First Amendment interests)
- United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d 1409 (6th Cir. 1991) (economic-regulation vagueness analysis)
- Fowler v. Bd. of Educ. of Lincoln Cty., 819 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1987) (upholding statutes using terms like "immorality" or "conduct unbecoming" against vagueness challenge)