Risper v. State of Delaware, 250 A.3d 76

Background

In May 2018 Corey Bailey was fatally shot by a masked gunman; eyewitness Channell Gray later identified McArthur Risper as the shooter. A jury convicted Risper of first‑degree murder, first‑degree conspiracy, and felony firearm; sentence was life plus 30 years.
Three weeks before the killing Bailey and his girlfriend Staci Weldon burglarized a trailer and stole an AR‑15 and 2–4 pounds of marijuana; Bailey left the items with O’Shea Waples. Bailey told others he expected retaliation and identified Risper as one of the people seeking revenge.
Witnesses placed Risper in a black Jeep in the neighborhood around the time of the shooting; police recovered the Jeep and found items with Risper’s DNA, including a black ski mask.
The State sought to admit, under D.R.E. 404(b) and Getz, evidence of Risper’s ownership of the stolen drugs/firearm and his participation in a home invasion at Waples’s residence to recover them, arguing the evidence showed motive, intent, identity, and absence of mistake.
Defense objections included hearsay and the Getz requirement that uncharged misconduct be proven by evidence that is "plain, clear, and conclusive." Separately, the State produced (very late) a recorded April 2019 interview of a witness (“AE”) who said someone else confessed to killing Bailey and showed her the gun; the CD was disclosed the day before trial. The defense also learned mid‑trial that Gray’s name had been redacted in a police report about a shoplifting scheme involving Weldon.
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s rulings admitting the 404(b) evidence but held the State’s eve‑of‑trial disclosure of AE’s recorded statement violated Brady and that denying a continuance was an abuse of discretion; the conviction was reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State or Movant)	Defendant's Argument (Risper)	Held
Admissibility of prior misconduct (ownership of stolen marijuana/firearm; Waples home invasion) under D.R.E. 404(b)/Getz	Evidence showed motive, intent, identity, absence of mistake; necessary context for murder	Evidence rested on inadmissible hearsay and did not meet Getz’s "plain, clear, and conclusive" proof requirement; prejudicial propensity evidence	Affirmed admission. Court found multiple out‑of‑court statements admissible (statements‑against‑interest/residual hearsay), sufficient to meet Getz and probative value outweighed prejudice.
Brady violation for late disclosure of AE’s April 2019 recorded interview (someone else’s confession and gun location)	Late production remedied by allowing play of CD and cross‑examination of detective; evidence not sufficiently material to overturn verdict	Withholding until eve of trial deprived defense of ability to investigate, subpoena, and conduct targeted defense; statement was clearly exculpatory and material	Found Brady violation. Timing impaired defense; allowing CD/playback and cross‑examination was not an adequate remedy and denial of continuance was an abuse of discretion. New trial ordered.
Late redaction/disclosure re: Gray/Weldon shoplifting (impeachment/Giglio)	Disclosure at trial was minor; impeachment value available to defense	Failure to disclose identity earlier deprived defense of impeachment preparation	Court agreed disclosure should have been earlier but did not fully resolve because AE Brady error alone warranted new trial.
Denial of continuance or dismissal after late Brady disclosure	Remedy of admitting CD and cross‑examining detective was sufficient; case strong so harmless	Defense needed time to investigate AE leads; continuance or dismissal necessary because delay prejudiced preparation	Denial of continuance was an abuse of discretion; dismissal was denied but relief required (new trial) because prejudice could not be cured at trial stage.

Key Cases Cited

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose exculpatory/impeaching evidence)
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (impeachment evidence falls within Brady disclosure obligations)
Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988) (Delaware standards for admitting uncharged‑misconduct evidence under D.R.E. 404(b))
Chavis v. State, 235 A.3d 696 (Del. 2020) (second‑hand police‑report testimony does not satisfy Getz’s plain, clear, and conclusive proof requirement)
Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972 (Del. 2014) (Delaware articulation of Brady materiality standard)
Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2001) (late disclosure may impair ability to investigate and use potentially exculpatory material)
Kyle v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (Brady materiality asks whether suppressed evidence undermines confidence in the outcome)