Rippo v. Baker
137 S. Ct. 905
| SCOTUS | 2017Background
- Michael Rippo was convicted of first-degree murder in Nevada and sentenced to death; during trial he learned the trial judge was the target of a federal bribery investigation.
- Rippo moved for the judge’s disqualification under the Due Process Clause, arguing that the judge could not be impartial if a party (or an office related to a party) was investigating the judge; the trial judge denied recusal.
- After the judge was indicted on federal charges, Rippo sought a new trial; a different trial judge denied the motion. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal, finding Rippo had not shown state involvement in the federal investigation.
- In state postconviction proceedings Rippo renewed his bias claim, presenting documents from the judge’s criminal trial suggesting the Clark County District Attorney’s Office had participated in the investigation. The state courts denied relief.
- The Nevada Supreme Court characterized Rippo’s claim as speculative and likened it to the "camouflaging bias" theory from Bracy v. Gramley, concluding Rippo had not shown actual bias or entitlement to discovery or an evidentiary hearing.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Nevada Supreme Court’s judgment, and remanded because the state court applied the wrong legal standard for judicial disqualification under the Due Process Clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Rippo) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Due Process required recusal when the judge was investigated by prosecutors | Judge tied to investigation of which the prosecution (or prosecutor’s office) participated creates an intolerable risk of bias warranting recusal | Nevada argued Rippo lacked evidence that state authorities were involved and thus no basis for recusal or discovery | Vacated and remanded: lower court applied wrong standard; question is objective risk of bias, not only actual subjective bias |
| Standard for judicial recusal under the Due Process Clause | Recusal may be required based on objective probability of bias even absent proof of actual bias | Federal and state courts below required showing of actual bias or specific proof tying state actors to investigation | Court held recusal inquiry asks whether the probability of bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable (objective standard) |
| Entitlement to discovery/evidentiary hearing on bias claims | Documents suggesting prosecutor involvement justify discovery/hearing to probe risk of bias | State courts denied discovery, treating allegations as speculative and insufficient without proof of actual bias | Court rejected requirement that litigant show actual bias before discovery; remanded to apply correct legal test |
| Whether Bracy v. Gramley controls and limits relief to cases alleging "camouflaging bias" | Rippo argued Bracy permits inquiry into objective risk and does not limit relief to camouflaging-bias scenarios | Nevada relied on Bracy to treat Rippo’s claim as speculative and outside Bracy’s protections | Court clarified Bracy did not impose a requirement that a litigant show actual bias or camouflaging-bias theory to obtain relief; correct test is objective risk assessment |
Key Cases Cited
- Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (recusal may be required even without proof of actual bias)
- Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (recusal required when probability of actual bias is too high to be tolerable)
- Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (discusses "camouflaging bias" and limits on speculative claims; warranted discovery where specific facts alleged)
- Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (Court assesses recusal claims by objective standard—whether average judge in position likely to be neutral)