Rimbert v. Eli Lilly and Co.
647 F.3d 1247
10th Cir.2011Background
- Rimbert's father was diagnosed with moderate depression and prescribed Prozac; dose increased, followed by the murder‑suicide of Rimbert's father and his wife.
- Rimbert filed a wrongful‑death suit against Eli Lilly alleging Prozac caused the deaths.
- Eli Lilly moved for summary judgment on preemption, evidentiary sufficiency, and to exclude Rimbert's sole causation expert under Daubert; initial judge partly denied these motions.
- Case was reassigned; second judge excluded the expert under Daubert; Rimbert sought a new scheduling order to designate a substitute expert, which the district court denied.
- District court then granted summary judgment for Lilly after excluding the expert; on appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Daubert exclusion but reversed the denial of a new scheduling order and remanded for further proceedings.
- On remand, the court considered reconsideration of the Daubert ruling, estoppel arguments, and whether a new scheduling order should be granted, with guidance to allow renewed motions consistent with the opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether law of the case prevents reconsideration of the Daubert ruling | Rimbert argues law of the case should bind the second judge | Lilly contends law of the case does not apply to interlocutory reassessments | Law of the case does not apply; reviewing court assesses abuse of discretion |
| Whether Lilly is estopped from seeking reconsideration due to earlier consent to the first disclosure | Rimbert asserts estoppel from Lilly's consent | Lilly argues the second disclosure created a changed circumstance warranting reassignment | Estoppel not applicable; second disclosure created new context and Lilly could seek reassessment |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Rimbert's motion for a new scheduling order | Rimbert contends flexibility was required given prior Daubert ruling and reassignment | Lilly argues no abuse given scheduling needs and prejudice concerns | Abuse of discretion; remand to consider renewed motions in first instance |
| Whether the district court should affirm on alternate grounds for summary judgment or remand for reconsideration | Rimbert challenges basis for summary judgment on causation | Lilly argues preemption, learned intermediary doctrine, or proximate causation issues support dismissal | Best to remand for district court to rule on renewed motions consistent with opinion |
Key Cases Cited
- Wilson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 160 F.3d 625 (10th Cir. 1998) (interlocutory Daubert rulings may be revisited on reconsideration)
- Been v. O.K. Indus., 495 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2007) (law of the case does not bind district courts on interlocutory orders)
- Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 538 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 2008) (orderly reconsideration of prior rulings permissible before final judgment)
- Summers v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Sys., 132 F.3d 599 (10th Cir. 1997) (factors for granting a new scheduling order; caution on prejudice and timing)
- 103 Investors I, L.P. v. Square D Co., 372 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2004) (considerations for modifying scheduling orders; importance of timeliness and prejudice)
- Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138 (10th Cir. 2000) (relevant to prejudice and flexibility in discovery/scheduling)