Riggs v. Curran, 863 F.3d 6

In 2009 National Grid contracted with Deepwater Wind to build a ≤10 MW offshore wind farm off Block Island and pass project costs to mainland Rhode Island ratepayers for up to 20 years under a state statute.
The Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission (PUC) initially rejected the PPA in March 2010 as not commercially reasonable; the General Assembly amended the standard and the PUC approved a revised PPA on August 16, 2010 (the PUC Order).
The PPA included post-approval contingencies permitting Deepwater to terminate if certain tax, financing, or permit conditions were not met; Deepwater later obtained required permits by the end of 2014 and began construction in 2015.
Plaintiffs (Rhode Island ratepayers and associations) sued in federal court on August 14, 2015, alleging the PUC Order violated the Federal Power Act, PURPA, and the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses; defendants included PUC commissioners, National Grid, and Deepwater.
The district court dismissed as time-barred, applying Rhode Island’s three-year personal-injury statute of limitations and holding plaintiffs’ claims accrued when the PUC Order issued on August 16, 2010.
The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) § 2462’s five-year limitations for enforcement actions did not apply because plaintiffs were not private attorneys general enforcing federal regulatory penalties, and (2) plaintiffs’ claims accrued when the PUC Order became final, more than three years before the suit.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Which statute of limitations governs plaintiffs' FPA/PURPA/constitutional claims?	§ 2462 (five-year limitations) applies because these are enforcement-like claims under federal statutes.	§ 2462 does not apply; plaintiffs are ratepayers seeking private economic relief, so the analogous state limitations period governs.	Rhode Island’s three-year personal-injury statute applies; § 2462 applies to government or private-attorney-general enforcement actions, not these private ratepayer claims.
When did plaintiffs’ claims accrue / ripeness for statute-of-limitations purposes?	Accrual did not occur until Deepwater obtained all permits or plaintiffs were first charged higher rates (late 2014), so suit filed in 2015 was timely.	Claims accrued when the PUC issued its final, unconditional order on August 16, 2010; later contingencies (permits, financing) affect mootness, not accrual/ripeness.	Claims accrued when the PUC Order became final (Aug 16, 2010); later permitting/financing issues do not delay accrual—plaintiffs filed after three years, so claims are time‑barred.

City of Fall River v. FERC, 507 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007) (FERC order conditioned on further agency approvals was not ripe)
Weaver's Cove Energy, LLC v. R.I. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, 589 F.3d 458 (1st Cir. 2009) (agency order was final and ripe because later approvals would not alter the contested decision)
Town of Barnstable v. O'Connor, 786 F.3d 130 (1st Cir. 2015) (ripeness: a dispute can be ripe even if future mootness is possible)
Marrapese v. Rhode Island, 749 F.2d 934 (1st Cir. 1984) (§ 1983 actions governed by state personal‑injury limitations)
Barrett ex rel. Estate of Barrett v. United States, 462 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2006) (federal courts borrow state limitations when federal statute is silent)
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (U.S. 1985) (framework for borrowing state statutes of limitations for federal claims)