915 N.W.2d 156
S.D.2018Background
- Riggs worked for Bennett County Hospital from 2006 until her termination in March 2015; she had depression and PTSD and had previously used a companion dog as an accommodation.
- Riggs formally requested permission to bring her companion dog to work on January 13, 2015, supported by her psychiatrist’s form; a hospital committee denied the request on January 28, 2015 and advised her of appeal rights.
- After the denial, Riggs had several confrontational incidents with management (including interrupting a board meeting and refusing to speak with supervisors) and the CEO terminated her on March 2, 2015 for insubordination and policy violations.
- Riggs applied for unemployment benefits; the hospital opposed her claim and the Division of Unemployment Insurance (DUI) found misconduct and denied benefits; Riggs appealed and DUI’s denial was affirmed by an ALJ.
- Riggs filed an ADA/SDHRA discrimination charge with DHR alleging termination for requesting the accommodation; DHR found probable cause on the first charge but later found no probable cause that the hospital’s opposition to her unemployment claim was retaliatory (second charge).
- The circuit court affirmed DHR’s no-probable-cause finding as to retaliation; the Supreme Court reversed that affirmance and remanded to DHR for further consideration of certain evidence (March 2 and March 11 letters, employer’s stated reason for termination, and any pretext evidence).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DHR erred in finding no probable cause that the Hospital opposed Riggs’s unemployment claim in retaliation for her protected activity | Riggs says the hospital opposed her unemployment claim in retaliation for requesting a companion-dog accommodation and filing a discrimination charge; March 2 and March 11 letters also constitute protected activity or evidence of causation | Hospital contends its opposition to the unemployment claim was motivated by Riggs’s misconduct (insubordination, policy violations) and that the timing is too remote to infer causation | Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s affirmance and remanded to DHR for further consideration of Riggs’s March 2 and March 11 letters, the hospital’s articulated reason for termination, and any evidence of pretext; did not itself decide probable cause |
Key Cases Cited
- Oehmke v. Medtronic, Inc., 844 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 2016) (but-for causation required for ADA retaliation claims)
- Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (but-for standard for retaliation claims)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (prima facie burden-shifting framework)
- Trammel v. Simmons First Bank of Searcy, 345 F.3d 611 (8th Cir. 2003) (time gaps of two months or more often insufficient to show causation)
- Kipp v. Mo. Hwy. & Transp. Comm’n, 280 F.3d 893 (8th Cir. 2002) (proximity in time factors into causation analysis)
- Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (employer must articulate legitimate nonretaliatory reason once prima facie case made)
- Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131 (8th Cir. 1999) (protected activity does not shield employees from discipline for disruptive conduct)
- Winegeart v. Winegeart, 910 N.W.2d 906 (S.D. 2018) (standard for overturning factual findings on appeal)