Ries v. City of Chicago
242 Ill. 2d 205
| Ill. | 2011Background
- On Feb. 22, 2002, Officer Oliva left his assignment, found Lowe, placed him in the back of Oliva's squad car, and did not handcuff him or remove the keys, leaving the engine running.
- Lowe stole the squad car and fled; Sergeant Veth and Officer Elmer pursued Lowe after the theft.
- Lowe crashed into Ries and Martinez at Pratt and Western after driving through a red light, causing severe injuries to both plaintiffs.
- Plaintiffs sued Officer Oliva and the City for willful and wanton misconduct, alleging failures to secure Lowe and to restrain the vehicle, among other conduct.
- The circuit court denied the City's and Oliva's motions to dismiss, directed verdicts were entered for Oliva on some claims, and the appellate court later held the City immune under 4-106(b) and reversed certain aspects, leading to the current review by the Illinois Supreme Court.
- The Supreme Court ultimately held that Lowe was an escaping prisoner protected by 4-106(b) and that 4-106(b) provides absolute immunity, which prevails over any 2-202 exceptions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DeSmet requires police control of the scene for 2-202 to apply. | Doe allowed 2-202; DeSmet later limits it. | 4-106(b) provides absolute immunity; 2-202 cannot override. | DeSmet does not require scene control to apply 2-202; but 4-106(b) controls here. |
| Whether a plaintiff must name the officer personally for 2-202 to apply. | 2-202 can be invoked against city as employer. | Officers not defendants means no 2-202 applicability to entity. | 2-202 does not override 4-106(b) immunity as to the City. |
| Whether 4-106(b) immunity applies to injuries caused by Lowe. | City may be liable for willful and wanton misconduct by officers. | Lowe was an escaping prisoner; injuries were inflicted by escaping prisoner; immunity applies. | Yes, the City is immune under 4-106(b). |
| Whether the directed verdict for Oliva binds or allows the City to be liable for willful/wanton misconduct. | Oliva's conduct could be considered with others; City may be liable. | Oliva's directed verdict removes liability for his conduct; City immune. | Once Oliva was directed for dismissal, the City cannot be held liable for Oliva's willful/wanton conduct; 4-106(b) governs. |
Key Cases Cited
- Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill.2d 374 (1994) (Doe permits 2-202 to avoid some immunities in certain contexts (overruled in part by Chicago Flood))
- Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill.2d 179 (1997) (2-202 does not override immunities absent express exception; overruled Doe on point)
- DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill.2d 497 (2006) (limits 2-202 applicability when no execution/enforcement of law or control of scene; clarifies 4-102 immunity)
- Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, 224 Ill.2d 213 (2007) (special considerations of immunity prevail over general immunities when narrowly targeted statute governs the issue)
- Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises, 196 Ill.2d 484 (2001) (immunity scope narrows when statute is specific; general immunities do not override)