Riemer v. State
342 S.W.3d 809
Tex. App.2011Background
- Interlocutory appeal from order denying class certification in takings dispute over Canadian River boundary east of Sanford Dam.
- Plaintiffs: Ri emer, Coon, June Coon Trust, Johnson Borger Ranch Partnership, and Montford Johnson III; Defendants: State of Texas and Jerry Patterson, General Land Office Commissioner.
- Proposed class covers owners of real property adjacent to the Canadian Riverbed for about 12 miles, with two sub-classes for surface interests and mineral/leasehold interests.
- Trial court held Coon Trust, Borger Ranch, and Johnson lacked standing; rigorous analysis required for class certification; issues of typicality and adequacy also addressed.
- Court on appeal found standing issue should be considered, reversed as to standing for those three, but affirmed denial of class certification on adequacy/typicality and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing of key plaintiffs to sue for takings | Coon, Borger Ranch, Johnson had or could have standing as landowners affected by boundary takings | Record shows these entities lacked ownership in 1981; standing should be dismissed | Trial court erred; standing issue remains unresolved; reverse as to standing for those parties |
| Adequacy of representation in class certification | Representatives can fairly and adequately protect class interests despite Boundary Agreement issues | Conflict with Boundary Agreement and split interests (north vs south of river) preclude adequacy | Trial court did not abuse its discretion; adequacy findings upheld; no certification |
| Effect of Boundary Agreement on certification | Boundary Agreement does not automatically bar representative claims | Agreement creates conflicts and ex ante releases that undermine class cohesiveness | Conflict due to Boundary Agreement supports denial of certification |
Key Cases Cited
- M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. 2001) (standing must be determined at suit filing; concrete, particularized injury)
- DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2008) (standing requires concrete injury; jurisdictional concerns)
- Hollywood Park Humane Soc'y v. Town of Hollywood Park, 261 S.W.3d 135 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008) (ownership timing for takings claims generally controls standing)
- Allodial Ltd. P'ship v. North Texas Tollway Auth., 176 S.W.3d 680 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005) (takings claim ownership rule; claims belong to entity owning property at time of injury)
- Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (U.S. 1997) (rigorous analysis required for class certification)
- Adams v. Reagan, 791 S.W.2d 284 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1990) (adequacy assessment in class actions; conflicts relevant to representation)
- Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982) (adequacy can be defeated by intra-class conflicts; need rigorous analysis)