Riegel v. Bowman
2017 Ohio 7388
Ohio Ct. App. 9th2017Background
- John Riegel and Brandy Riegel (now Bowman) divorced in 2005; Brandy was designated residential parent and legal custodian of their daughter E.R., then age 2.
- Brandy later remarried and relocated with E.R. to North Dakota, then Arizona, and in 2014 moved back to Ohio (Fairfield County) with E.R. and three younger sons; John remained in Ohio.
- In November 2014 Brandy moved to modify parenting time and child support; John filed for reallocation of parental rights (custody).
- A guardian ad litem (GAL) recommended Brandy remain the residential parent; after a December 2015 evidentiary hearing the magistrate recommended and the trial court adopted a decision re-allocating residential custody to John.
- Brandy objected; on appeal she challenged the trial court’s application of R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a), arguing the court failed to properly determine that the harm of a change of environment was outweighed by its advantages.
- The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding the reallocation to John was an abuse of discretion for insufficient evidentiary support under R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Riegel) | Defendant's Argument (Bowman) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court properly found a change in circumstances to permit custody modification under R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) | John argued Brandy’s move back to Ohio (and past relocations/visitation issues) constituted a change in circumstances warranting reallocation | Brandy argued a relocation alone is generally insufficient; her long-term custodial status and child’s ties weighed against finding a qualifying change | Held: The court found the record inadequately supported a qualifying change of circumstances; reallocation was an abuse of discretion |
| Whether the trial court properly applied the R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a)(iii) harm-vs-advantage test | John asserted advantages (including better facilitation of parenting time) outweighed harm of moving child | Brandy argued the magistrate gave only cursory analysis and did not show advantages outweighed the disruption to a child long in her custody | Held: The appellate court concluded the trial court failed to provide adequate evidentiary support that advantages outweighed likely harm; reversal required |
| Whether overlap between R.C. 3109.04(F) best-interest factors and the E(1)(a)(iii) change-of-environment analysis justified custody change | John relied on best-interest factors (e.g., facilitation of visitation) to support change | Brandy contended best-interest factors do not substitute for the separate statutory harm/advantage finding required to modify custody | Held: Court emphasized the two inquiries are distinct; relying on F-factors did not satisfy the E(1)(a)(iii) requirement |
| Whether remaining assignments (procedural rulings, timing of Brandy’s motion, manifest weight) required relief | John and trial court defended procedural rulings and credited magistrate/trier-of-fact discretion | Brandy argued procedural errors and that reallocation was against the manifest weight of the evidence | Held: Appellate court found these issues moot given reversal on the dispositive statutory ground and did not address them on the merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71 (1988) (abuse-of-discretion is standard for appellate review of custody allocations)
- Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415 (1997) (trial court afforded wide latitude in custody determinations)