Riddle v. Buncombe Cty. Bd. of Educ.Â
256 N.C. App. 72
| N.C. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- In July 2011 at T.C. Roberson High School, varsity coach James Beatty authorized team members (all minors) to use a John Deere utility vehicle without training.
- During a practice/drill, teammate Roderick Brown drove the John Deere at an unsafe speed and struck teammate Donald Crotty, causing severe head/brain injuries; Nicholas Riddle narrowly avoided being hit.
- Riddle alleges he witnessed Crotty’s injury and suffered severe emotional distress requiring treatment; he sued Buncombe County Board of Education, Beatty (individual/official), and Brown (individual/official) for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6); the trial court granted the motion for failure to state a claim, finding plaintiff’s severe emotional distress not reasonably foreseeable.
- On appeal, the sole legal question was whether Riddle sufficiently alleged that defendants’ negligence foreseeably caused severe emotional distress either to him personally or as a bystander to Crotty’s injuries.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Riddle pleaded NIED based on fear for his own safety | Riddle claims he narrowly avoided being struck and thereafter experienced severe emotional distress | Defendants contend temporary fright is not the ‘‘severe emotional distress’’ required for NIED | Dismissed — allegations of momentary fear are insufficient to show severe emotional distress |
| Whether Riddle pleaded bystander NIED from witnessing Crotty’s injury (friend/teammate) | Riddle alleges he contemporaneously observed the injury, was a friend/teammate known to defendants, and suffered continuing severe distress requiring treatment | Defendants argue no allegation shows an unusually close relationship or defendant knowledge of any peculiar susceptibility, so distress was not reasonably foreseeable | Dismissed — relationship and foreseeability allegations insufficient to establish proximate cause for bystander NIED |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 327 N.C. 283 (establishes standard for pleading NIED and that mere temporary fright is inadequate)
- Ruark v. (same as Johnson) cited above, 327 N.C. 283 (foreseeability and severe emotional distress standard; bystander factors)
- Sorrells v. M.Y.B. Hosp. Ventures of Asheville, 334 N.C. 669 (discusses factors for bystander claims and that listed factors are not mechanistic requirements)
- Gardner v. Gardner, 334 N.C. 662 (foreseeability limitation on emotional-distress recovery)
- Andersen v. Baccus, 335 N.C. 526 (examples of bystander recovery in close familial contexts)
- Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181 (Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standard)
- Wrenn v. Byrd, 120 N.C. App. 761 (requires proof of defendant’s knowledge of plaintiff’s peculiar susceptibility where injury would not be caused to a person of normal sensitivity)
