Ricky E. Arion v. State of Indiana, 2016 Ind. App. LEXIS 200

Background

In Sept. 2013 Carroll County filed burglary, sexual battery, and criminal confinement charges and issued a warrant; Arion, incarcerated in Miami Correctional Facility, was served the warrant on Sept. 10, 2013, but the warrant was not returned to the Carroll Circuit Court.
On Sept. 13, 2013 Arion filed a pro se Rule 4(B) speedy-trial motion; he later filed a motion to dismiss (Dec. 16, 2013) which the court denied based on the missing returned warrant.
Arion filed a motion to reconsider on Jan. 27, 2014 attaching a copy of the served warrant and served the State; the court summarily denied it that day.
The State made no effort to try Arion for over a year; Arion renewed objections and filed a discharge motion under Crim. R. 4(B), 4(C), and the Sixth Amendment in July 2015; the trial court denied discharge, reasoning that Rule 4 timing began when the court had actual knowledge of the arrest.
The Court of Appeals held the State cannot avoid Rule 4 obligations by failing to return a served warrant, found the delay unjustified and beyond the limits of Rules 4(B) and 4(C), and reversed with instructions to dismiss the charges.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Arion)	Held
When does the Rule 4 time clock begin for an incarcerated defendant served with a warrant in another facility?	Clock begins when the trial court has actual knowledge of the arrest (i.e., after return of warrant).	Clock begins when defendant is arrested/served and when defendant files a Rule 4(B) motion — the State bears the burden to bring him to trial.	The clock began no later than Jan. 27, 2014 (when Arion filed a served motion with copy of the warrant); actual knowledge by the court is not a prerequisite.
Whether the State may evade Rule 4 by failing to return a served warrant to the court	Failure to return warrant prevents Rule 4 from applying until court learns of arrest.	State error cannot be used to deprive defendant of Rule 4 protections; court and prosecutor have an affirmative duty.	Rejected: State cannot rely on its own failure to avoid Rule 4 duties.
Applicability of Rule 4(B) vs. Rule 4(C) timing and entitlement to discharge	Court concluded Arion objected under 4(C) at hearing and found no prejudice; contended timing began when court ordered transport in 2015.	Arion asserted entitlement under 4(B) (70 days) and 4(C) (one year) because he timely moved and caused no delay.	Court of Appeals held Arion was entitled to relief under Rules 4(B)/4(C); the year-plus delay after Jan. 27, 2014 violated Rule 4.
Whether other counties’ custody or practical considerations justified delay	Cited precedent where return/transfer timing controlled when another county had priority (Johnson/Kohlmeyer, Landrum).	No other county had interest here; no practical necessity existed to delay transfer.	Distinguishing precedent: not applicable; no practical reason for delay, so State’s inaction unjustified.

Key Cases Cited

Zehrlaut v. State, 230 Ind. 175, 102 N.E.2d 203 (1951) (Rule 4 places an imperative duty on state, trial courts, and prosecutors)
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to speedy trial is a fundamental constitutional protection)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (speedy-trial analysis and State’s primary burden to bring defendant to trial)
Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969) (State must act diligently and in good faith to protect speedy-trial right)
Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973) (incarceration on unrelated charges does not eliminate interest in prompt trial on new charges)
Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. 2013) (Crim. R. 4 implements the constitutional speedy-trial right)
Rust v. State, 792 N.E.2d 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (State relieved only for delay caused by defendant or defendant-requested continuance)
Fuller v. State, 995 N.E.2d 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (discharge not always appropriate where court/prosecutor lacked actual knowledge of defendant’s whereabouts)
Fueston v. State, 953 N.E.2d 545 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (actual knowledge of whereabouts can be relevant in some Rule 4(C) analyses)
Werner v. State, 818 N.E.2d 26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (same)
State ex rel. Johnson v. Kohlmeyer, 261 Ind. 244, 301 N.E.2d 518 (1973) (Rule 4 timing may await return when another county’s custody needs precedence)
Landrum v. State, 428 N.E.2d 1228 (Ind. 1981) (arrest for Rule 4 can be when defendant is returned when incarcerated elsewhere; limited to certain rule subsections)
Poore v. State, 685 N.E.2d 36 (Ind. 1997) (Rule 4 serves as incentive for prompt adjudication)
Cundiff v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. 2012) (Rule 4(B) requires defendant be held on the charge when moving for speedy trial)
Fisher v. State, 933 N.E.2d 526 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (disfavored policy of passively waiting for completion of foreign jurisdiction sentence)