Rickman v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 531

Joseph Boyd Rickman was convicted in 2003 of multiple sexual offenses against children and sentenced to 75 years (60 suspended).
The Commonwealth filed an SVPA petition on August 28, 2015, seeking civil commitment upon Rickman’s release.
Code § 37.2-906(A)(ii) requires the circuit court to schedule a probable-cause hearing within 90 days unless the respondent waives the hearing or the court enters a continuance for good cause or by agreement.
Parties exchanged emails attempting to set the hearing within 90 days but ultimately scheduled it for January 8, 2016 — 43 days after the 90-day deadline — without a continuance order entered by the court.
Rickman moved to dismiss the SVPA petition as a statutory violation; the circuit court denied dismissal and proceeded to find probable cause and, after a merits hearing, civilly committed Rickman to inpatient treatment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether holding the probable-cause hearing beyond the 90-day period required dismissal of the SVPA petition with prejudice	Rickman: the statute’s “shall” is mandatory and requires dismissal (with prejudice) if the 90-day deadline is missed	Commonwealth: the statute is directory; it contains no express remedy of dismissal and courts retain remedial discretion	The Court held the SVPA scheduling requirement is directory, not mandatory; dismissal with prejudice is not the statutory, exclusive remedy and was not required
Whether Rickman waived the 90-day claim by acquiescing to the later date	Rickman: he did not waive and preserved objection in emails	Commonwealth: counsel’s conduct and failure to file a motion or objection before the deadline amounted to acquiescence	The Court did not decide waiver; it ruled that even absent waiver the statutory scheme does not mandate dismissal
Whether due-process principles independently required dismissal because of the delay	Rickman: delay violated due process and required dismissal	Commonwealth: no prejudice shown; discretionary remedies suffice	No due-process violation shown — Rickman alleged no prejudice from the delay, so dismissal was not required

Hood v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 526 (2010) (use of “shall” generally construed directory rather than mandatory)
Tran v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 260 Va. 654 (2000) (timing provisions can be directory; lack of prejudice may negate need for dismissal)
Butler v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 614 (2002) (failure to meet timing requirements is not per se reversible error where statute lacks prohibitory language)
Jamborsky v. Baskins, 247 Va. 506 (1994) (procedural timing was directory and courts may fashion remedies)
Townes v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 234 (2005) (conditions for filing SVPA petition must exist at time of identification)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (balancing test for speedy-trial claims — referenced analogously)
Flanary v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 204 (1945) (discussing the severe effect of statutory discharge remedies)