Rickey Lewis v. Rick Thaler, Director, 701 F.3d 783

Background

Lewis filed a successive federal habeas petition asserting he is mentally retarded and ineligible for execution under Atkins.
Texas state courts conducted an Atkins hearing and concluded, by FFCL, that Lewis had not proven markedly subaverage intellectual functioning by a preponderance.
Four experts testified: Rosin (IQ 79), Martin (IQ 59), Garnett (re-scored 75), and Gripon (IQ around 70); the state court found Gripon and Rosin more credible.
The district court initially declined to consider Dr. Roid’s affidavit challenging Rosin’s 79 IQ score, citing AEDPA limitations, and denied relief.
This court previously remanded to reconsider Dr. Roid’s affidavit in light of Dowthitt and Morris, but Pinholster later restricted review to the state-court record, affecting consideration of new evidence.
On the merits, the court addressed whether the Briseno factors properly inform the first prong of Texas’s Atkins analysis and whether the state court’s factual determinations were reasonable under AEDPA.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the state court’s Atkins determination was unreasonable	Lewis argues the Briseno-based analysis and IQ scores show subaverage functioning.	State asserts the record supports the court’s finding of no significant subaverage functioning by preponderance.	No; the state court’s determination was not unreasonable under AEDPA.
Whether Briseno factors properly inform all three Atkins prongs	Applying Briseno to the first prong conflicts with Atkins.	Briseno factors are consistent with Atkins and used to assess all prongs.	No conflict; Briseno factors valid for informing the Atkins analysis.
Whether new Dr. Roid affidavit could be considered after Pinholster	Roid’s testimony supplements state-court evidence and should be considered.	Under Pinholster, new evidence cannot be used to revisit § 2254(d)(1) merits analysis.	No; Pinholster limits review to the state-court record for § 2254(d)(1) adjudications.
Whether the state court’s factual determinations were UNREASONABLE in light of the record	Exclusion of some experts and reliance on certain prison IQ tests were unreasonable.	The court credibly weighed evidence, credibility determinations, and corroborating factors.	No; the record supports the state court’s factual determinations under § 2254(d)(2).
Whether the district court erred by misapplying AEDPA standards of review	District court merged §§ 2254(a), (d)(1), (e)(1) improperly.	Court correctly applied the AEDPA framework and Cullen v. Pinholster.	No; the court properly applied AEDPA standards.

Key Cases Cited

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (U.S. 2002) (prohibits execution of mentally retarded individuals)
Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (factors for evaluating subaverage intellectual functioning; applies to Atkins analysis)
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (U.S. 2003) (AEDPA deference; no need for clear-and-convincing evidence for § 2254(d)(1))
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (S. Ct. 2011) (limits § 2254(d)(1) review to state-court record)
Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2000) (new affidavits treated under exhaustion; evidence not barrier to review)
Morris v. Dretke, 413 F.3d 484 (5th Cir. 2005) (new expert evidence addressed under exhaustion when not raised in state court)
Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2007) (prison IQ scores may be weighed but are not determinative)
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (U.S. 2011) (clear-error standard for state-court factual findings; defer to reasonable applications)