Rickey I. Kanter v. William P. Barr
919 F.3d 437
| 7th Cir. | 2019Background
- Rickey Kanter pleaded guilty to one count of mail fraud, was sentenced to 1 year and 1 day, and reimbursed Medicare; his felony conviction triggers lifetime firearm prohibitions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m).
- § 922(g)(1) bars possession by anyone convicted of a crime punishable by over a year; § 925(c) historically permitted individual relief but has been inoperative because Congress defunded its implementation.
- Kanter sued in federal district court alleging the federal and state felon-dispossession statutes violate the Second Amendment as applied to him (a nonviolent, first-time offender with no subsequent convictions).
- The district court held the statutes constitutional as applied to Kanter under intermediate scrutiny (the government showed a substantial relation between the ban and the important interest of preventing gun violence) and entered judgment for defendants.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed, applying the two-step Second Amendment framework (textual/historical threshold; if unresolved, means-end scrutiny) and concluding that even assuming Kanter could bring an as-applied challenge, the government met its burden under intermediate scrutiny.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m) violate the Second Amendment as applied to Kanter | Kanter: as a nonviolent, first-time felon with no history of violence or firearm misuse, the statutes are not substantially related to preventing gun violence and are unconstitutional as applied | Government: statutes serve important public-safety interest; felons (including nonviolent ones) are more likely than general population to misuse firearms; categorical rules are administrable and reasonable | Affirmed for defendants: government satisfied intermediate scrutiny; statutes substantially related to preventing gun violence when applied to Kanter |
| Whether felons as a class fall outside the Second Amendment's historical scope (threshold inquiry) | Kanter: historical evidence does not clearly show felons were categorically excluded; thus protections may apply | Government: Heller callouts and some historical sources support longstanding prohibitions on felons, but history is contested | Court: historical evidence inconclusive; court proceeded to step two rather than resolve threshold question |
| Proper standard and rigor of review for as-applied felon challenges | Kanter: requires individualized, fact‑specific inquiry and evidence tailored to him | Government: intermediate scrutiny akin to means‑end review; reasonable (not perfect) fit suffices; Congress may adopt categorical bans for administrability | Court: applied intermediate scrutiny; fit need only be reasonable; government met burden |
| Whether Kanter's particular offense (mail fraud) and personal circumstances defeat application of the statute | Kanter: nonviolent fraud, mitigating personal factors (employment, marriage, no drugs) mean statute is overbroad as applied | Government: recidivism and empirical studies show nonviolent felons have nontrivial rates of later violent or firearm‑related offending; Congress previously rejected individualized restoration as infeasible | Court: Kanter's felony was serious and his circumstances do not rebut governmental showing; individualized inquiry is administratively problematic; statute applies constitutionally to him |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognizes individual right to bear arms but notes longstanding prohibitions, including those barring felons, are "presumptively lawful")
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporates Second Amendment protections against the states and reiterates Heller's caution about longstanding prohibitions)
- United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholds categorical firearm prohibitions for certain groups and explains Congress may adopt class‑wide exclusions without case‑by‑case proof)
- Binderup v. Attorney Gen., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (fractured decision recognizing a possible as‑applied route to success for some nonviolent offenders; useful contrast on methodology)
- United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (applies intermediate scrutiny and recognizes § 922(g)(1) may be constitutional as applied to violent felons but flags overbreadth concerns for nonviolent felons)
- United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2010) (supports the government's interest by noting felons have higher rates of illegal and violent gun use)