Richmont Holdings, Inc. v. Superior Recharge Systems, L.L.C., 455 S.W.3d 573

Richmont bought assets of Superior Recharge under an Asset Purchase Agreement that contained an arbitration clause; Jon Blake (part-owner) had a separate employment agreement with a noncompete (no arbitration clause).
Blake sued Richmont in Denton County for fraud, breach, and a declaration the noncompete was unenforceable; Richmont separately sued Blake in Dallas County to enforce the noncompete and moved to transfer the Denton suit (motion never decided).
Richmont engaged only in minimal discovery in the Denton action (a request for disclosure), largely refused to respond to Blake’s discovery, and was sanctioned $5,000; no trial date was set.
Nineteen months after being sued, Richmont moved to compel arbitration, asserting Blake’s claims fell under the Asset Purchase Agreement’s arbitration clause; Blake argued Richmont waived arbitration by substantially invoking the judicial process.
The trial court denied the motion to compel; the court of appeals initially held the arbitration clause did not apply but on review Texas Supreme Court found that holding erroneous and remanded; on remand the court of appeals found waiver and affirmed.
The Texas Supreme Court granted review, held Richmont did not substantially invoke the judicial process under the totality of the circumstances, reversed the court of appeals, and remanded to the trial court.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Richmont waived the arbitration clause by substantially invoking the judicial process	Blake: Richmont waited 19 months, filed a separate suit, moved to transfer venue, failed to respond to discovery, and thereby prejudiced Blake	Richmont: Filing a separate suit, moving to transfer, minimal discovery, and delay do not show substantial invocation or prejudice	No waiver — under the totality of circumstances Richmont did not substantially invoke the judicial process
Whether filing a second suit or moving to transfer venue constitutes waiver of arbitration	Blake: Separate actions and venue maneuvering show invocation of courts and waiver	Richmont: Filing suit and moving to transfer do not address the merits and do not by themselves waive arbitration	Filing a separate suit or moving to transfer does not, by itself, waive arbitration
Whether delay in seeking arbitration and limited discovery alone prove waiver or prejudice	Blake: Long delay plus discovery refusal and sanctions demonstrate prejudice	Richmont: Delay occurred but discovery was minimal; delay alone is insufficient to demonstrate waiver or prejudice	Mere delay and limited discovery are insufficient; waiver requires substantial invocation and prejudice (not shown)

Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2008) (standard for waiver by substantially invoking judicial process and factors to consider)
In re D. Wilson Constr. Co., 196 S.W.3d 774 (Tex. 2006) (filing suit in separate action does not inherently waive arbitration)
In re Fleetwood Homes of Tex., L.P., 257 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. 2008) (delay in seeking arbitration not dispositive of waiver)
In re Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 759 (Tex. 2006) (extended litigation does not automatically waive arbitration absent prejudice)
Prudential Sec. Inc. v. Marshall, 909 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. 1995) (delay alone does not constitute waiver; prejudice must be shown)
Kennedy Hodges, L.L.P. v. Gobellan, 433 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. 2014) (law firm did not waive arbitration by litigating with a former associate)