Richmond Health Facilities-Kenwood, LP v. Nichols
811 F.3d 192
6th Cir.2016Background
- Decedent Charlie Nichols signed an arbitration agreement with a nursing facility at admission; the agreement purported to cover "any and all disputes" including "wrongful death" and to bind persons with claims through or on behalf of him.
- Nichols later sued the facility in state court; Plaintiffs (successors/assigns of the facility operator that signed the agreement) removed to federal court and filed to compel arbitration of the amended state-court claims after Nichols died and Adrianne Nichols was named executrix.
- The district court compelled arbitration of most claims under the agreement but denied arbitration of the wrongful-death claim, relying on Kentucky precedent (Ping) holding wrongful-death claims are independent and cannot be bound by a decedent’s pre-death contract.
- Plaintiffs appealed, arguing Ping is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and/or Concepcion and Marmet, so wrongful-death beneficiaries may be compelled to arbitrate under the decedent’s agreement.
- The Sixth Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed: under Kentucky law (Ping and its progeny) wrongful-death claims are independent and beneficiaries are not bound by an arbitration agreement signed only by the decedent; the FAA does not preempt that state-law rule here.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiffs' Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether wrongful-death beneficiaries are bound by an arbitration agreement signed only by the decedent | The decedent’s agreement (which purports to bind persons with claims through him) binds wrongful-death beneficiaries; Ping is preempted by the FAA (Concepcion/Marmet) | Under Kentucky law (Ping), wrongful-death claims are independent and beneficiaries have their own property interest, so they are not bound by the decedent’s agreement | Held: Beneficiaries are not bound; Ping controls and FAA does not preempt that rule |
| Whether Ping is preempted by the FAA under Concepcion’s framework | Concepcion and Marmet preempt state rules that categorically prohibit or disproportionately burden arbitration; thus Ping should be displaced | Ping does not categorically ban arbitration and does not disproportionately burden arbitration because beneficiaries remain free to agree to arbitrate | Held: Ping is not preempted; it does not categorically forbid arbitration nor impose a disproportionate burden like the California rule in Concepcion |
| Whether Ping’s discussion of wrongful-death arbitration is dicta or otherwise nonbinding | Ping’s wrongful-death analysis is dicta/ nonbinding so this court should not follow it | Ping’s wrongful-death analysis was an alternative holding and has been reaffirmed by Kentucky courts, so it is authoritative | Held: Ping’s analysis is controlling (or at least persuasive and followed by Kentucky courts) |
| Whether retroactivity or separation-of-powers arguments defeat Ping’s application | Agreement predates Ping; courts shouldn’t apply later case law retroactively or Ping usurped legislature | Ping is consistent with long-standing Kentucky precedent recognizing wrongful-death actions as independent; later cases (including Whisman) applied Ping retroactively | Held: These arguments fail; Ping is an affirmation of state law and applies here |
Key Cases Cited
- Ping v. Beverly Enterprises, 376 S.W.3d 581 (Ky. 2012) (Kentucky Supreme Court holding wrongful-death claims are independent and beneficiaries are not bound by decedent’s arbitration agreement)
- AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (Supreme Court framework for FAA preemption of state rules that categorically prohibit or disproportionately burden arbitration)
- Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam) (state public-policy rule categorically prohibiting arbitration in nursing-home negligence cases preempted by FAA)
- Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (federal policy favoring arbitration and the FAA’s relation to litigation stay statute)
- AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643 (1986) (arbitration is a matter of contract; parties cannot be compelled to arbitrate disputes they did not agree to submit)