Richburg v. Conagra Brands, Inc., 1:22-cv-02420

Background

Two related class actions (Richburg v. Conagra, No. 22 CV 2420; Ruiz v. Conagra, No. 22 CV 2421) challenged Conagra microwave popcorn packaging (Orville Redenbacher’s and Angie’s BOOMCHICKAPOP) as falsely implying products contain only "real" or "natural" ingredients while allegedly exposing consumers to PFAS migrated from popping bags.
Plaintiffs relied on third‑party laboratory testing detecting organic fluorine in the microwave popping bags (alleged as a surrogate for PFAS) and alleged they paid a price premium because of labeling claims; they sought monetary and injunctive relief and multi‑state/nationwide classes.
Conagra asked the court to take judicial notice of an FDA webpage listing authorized PFAS uses (including microwave popcorn bags) and moved to dismiss all counts, arguing lack of Article III standing, insufficient PFAS pleadings, that labels would not mislead a reasonable consumer, and preemption among other defenses.
The court took judicial notice of the FDA document and treated plaintiffs’ allegations about testing as plausible at the pleading stage, but analyzed standing and the reasonable‑consumer issue in depth.
The court held plaintiffs had Article III standing to pursue monetary damages on their individual claims (price‑premium theory) but not injunctive relief; plaintiffs lacked standing to assert claims under laws of states where they did not reside/purchase for nationwide classes.
Ultimately, the court dismissed all counts with prejudice because, as a matter of law, reasonable consumers would not interpret the packaging statements to mean migratory packaging substances (like PFAS) are "ingredients," given the FDA exemption for substances that migrate from packaging.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Article III standing (economic injury)	Plaintiffs paid a price premium based on labeling (“only real/natural ingredients”) and thus suffered concrete, particularized economic injury.	No concrete injury: plaintiffs received functioning products and gave only conclusory premium allegations; lack of particularized proof (e.g., tested items).	Standing exists for monetary damages under the price‑premium theory for plaintiffs’ own purchases (not for injunctive relief). Plaintiffs lack standing to assert out‑of‑state class claims where they did not purchase.
Sufficiency of PFAS allegations / testing	Third‑party lab testing of popping bags detected organic fluorine, a generally accepted surrogate for PFAS, sufficient at pleading stage.	Tests are too conclusory/indirect (tested bags, not popcorn; detected organic fluorine not proven to be harmful PFAS).	Allegations about testing and PFAS migration are plausible enough to survive a merits‑avoiding dismissal; discovery is appropriate.
Deceptive‑practice claim (reasonable consumer standard)	Label statements (“only real ingredients,” “nothing fake”) imply absence of artificial PFAS and are deceptive if PFAS migrates into food.	Reasonable consumers would not treat migratory packaging substances as "ingredients"; FDA exempts migrating substances from ingredient lists.	Dismissal granted: as a matter of law reasonable consumers would not interpret the labels to include migratory PFAS as "ingredients," so claims fail.
Preemption / unjust enrichment	Plaintiffs argued state consumer protection/civil claims appropriate; unjust enrichment asserted as alternative remedy.	Federal regulation and FDA framework may preempt state claims; unjust enrichment depends on surviving statutory claims.	Court did not reach preemption given its ingredient‑interpretation ruling; unjust enrichment dismissed because underlying claims were dismissed.

Key Cases Cited

Doss v. Clearwater Title Co., 551 F.3d 634 (7th Cir.) (courts may take judicial notice of matters of public record on a motion to dismiss)
Denius v. Dunlap, 330 F.3d 919 (7th Cir.) (judicial notice of official government website material is routine)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requires concrete, particularized, and traceable injury)
Geske v. PNY Techs., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 3d 687 (N.D. Ill.) (facial standing challenges use Rule 12(b)(6) standard)
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (injunctive relief requires certainly impending future injury)
In re Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder, 903 F.3d 278 (3d Cir.) (economic injury where product functions and no substantial risk of harm may be insufficient)
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (standing requires concrete and particularized injury)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standard for facial plausibility)
Bober v. Glaxo Wellcome PLC, 246 F.3d 934 (7th Cir.) (deception requires likelihood or capacity to deceive under reasonable consumer standard)
Benson v. Fannie May Confections Brands, Inc., 944 F.3d 639 (7th Cir.) (reasonable consumer standard explained)
Bell v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 982 F.3d 468 (7th Cir.) (context and all information available to consumers considered in deception analysis)
In re Aqua Dots Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748 (7th Cir.) (standing and reliance principles in consumer product contexts)
Cosmetique, Inc. v. ValueClick, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 2d 716 (N.D. Ill.) (courts should not resolve merits disputes disguised as pleading defects)