Richardson v. Underwood, 1:18-cv-07694

Background:

In January 2008 Helen Abbot was found dead; surveillance and DNA linked Mark Richardson to her apartment on January 11, 2008.
Richardson gave a warned statement on February 5, 2008 about being at Abbot’s apartment; police later obtained phone and DNA evidence.
On July 10, 2008 Richardson was questioned for ~45 minutes without Miranda warnings (Early Morning Statement), then was Mirandized and invoked silence; shortly after he spoke again following prodding by a detective (Late Morning Statement) and later gave a videotaped, Mirandized statement to an ADA (Video Statement).
At a state suppression hearing the trial court suppressed the July 10 Early Morning and Late Morning statements but admitted parts of the Video Statement and the February 5 statement; the Appellate Division affirmed and the Court of Appeals denied leave.
Richardson sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 arguing Seibert required suppression of the later statements; the district court denied relief, finding the state courts reasonably applied New York law (Chapple/Paulman) and federal precedent (Elstad/Miranda) and that there was no deliberate two-step strategy.
The district court issued a certificate of appealability limited to whether the state courts erred by applying Chapple instead of Seibert.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a deliberate two-step interrogation (Seibert) occurred	Richardson: detectives intentionally used an unwarned-then-warned tactic to elicit confession, so Seibert requires suppression absent curative measures	State: trial court credited testimony that the failure to Mirandize was misjudgment, not deliberate strategy; New York Chapple/Paulman factors applied	Held: No deliberate two-step; state courts’ factual finding reasonable under AEDPA and Seibert inapplicable
Whether postwarning statements are admissible under Elstad (voluntariness)	Richardson: initial unwarned questioning tainted later statements; voluntariness lacking	State: ADA properly Mirandized Richardson; several-hour break and voluntary demeanor support voluntariness	Held: Postwarning Video Statement was voluntary under Elstad; limited prewarning statements were properly suppressed
Whether Richardson’s invocation of right to remain silent was scrupulously honored (Mosley)	Richardson: he invoked silence; subsequent questioning improperly resumed and tainted later statements	State: Richardson initiated further conversation (asked about exposure), giving reasonable basis to infer he changed his mind; courts suppressed closely tainted remarks	Held: State courts reasonably concluded Richardson initiated renewed discussion and waiver was not objectively unreasonable
Whether the Appellate Division’s decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under §2254(d)	Richardson: failure to cite Seibert shows misapplication of Supreme Court precedent	State: outcome and reasoning did not contradict Supreme Court law; state courts applied Chapple/Paulman and credited factual findings	Held: AEDPA deference controls; state-court rulings were not contrary to or objectively unreasonable, so habeas relief denied

Key Cases Cited

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation warnings required)
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (an unwarned statement does not automatically taint a later warned, voluntary statement)
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (two-step deliberate tactic requires suppression of postwarning statements absent curative measures)
People v. Chapple, 38 N.Y.2d 112 (1975) (New York rule requiring Miranda warnings before custodial questioning unless a definite break occurs)
People v. Paulman, 5 N.Y.3d 122 (2005) (factors for assessing whether statements form a continuous chain of events under New York law)
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (invocation of right to remain silent must be scrupulously honored; questioning may resume if suspect initiates)
Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 23 (2011) (failure to Mirandize does not automatically establish a Seibert violation absent an earlier confession to be repeated)
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (fruit of the poisonous tree and the relationship between Fourth Amendment taint and subsequent statements)
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) (Miranda rule's violation does not necessarily require exclusion of physical evidence as fruit of the poisonous tree)