Richardson v. U.S. Parole Commission
236 F. Supp. 3d 168
| D.D.C. | 2017Background
- Petitioner (Richardson) was convicted in D.C. Superior Court for distribution and possession with intent to distribute cocaine in 1989 and received consecutive sentences in 1989 and 1993, producing an aggregate sentence computed at 22 years.
- He was paroled in 1996 and has since had parole revoked seven times; his most recent parole began October 31, 2015 and was to run until January 13, 2019.
- Petitioner filed a pro se habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 arguing his judicially imposed sentence "expired" (should have ended in 2010) and that the Parole Commission improperly extended his sentence.
- He asserted separation-of-powers, double jeopardy, and ex post facto violations arising from the Parole Commission’s recalculation of his time (denying credit for street time after revocations).
- The Parole Commission and the government opposed, arguing the Commission acts within its authorized executive/paroling role, parole revocation does not trigger double jeopardy, and forfeiture of street time under D.C. law does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Separation of powers | Parole Commission extended judicial sentence, usurping judicial power | Commission executes sentences; has authority to grant/deny/revoke parole under D.C. law | Commission did not violate separation of powers; its actions are executive/paroling functions |
| Whether sentence "expired" / custody unlawful | Sentence should have expired in 2010; continued custody unlawful | Aggregate sentence properly recalculated after parole revocations under D.C. law | Petitioner remains in lawful custody; no basis for habeas relief |
| Double jeopardy | Revocations and continued custody amount to successive punishment | Parole proceedings are not criminal prosecutions; they continue original sentence, not successive punishment | Double jeopardy does not apply to parole revocations |
| Ex post facto | Recalculation and loss of street-time credit retroactively increased punishment | D.C. law bars credit for street time after revocation; recalculation merely restores original position | No ex post facto violation; loss of street time credit permissible under controlling law |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown v. United States Parole Comm'n, 190 F. Supp. 3d 186 (D.D.C. 2016) (parole actions are part of sentence execution; double jeopardy and ex post facto frameworks explained)
- Franklin v. District of Columbia, 163 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing transfer of D.C. parole jurisdiction to Parole Commission)
- Maddox v. Elzie, 238 F.3d 437 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Parole Commission’s jurisdiction pertains to execution of judicial sentence)
- Rahim v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 77 F. Supp. 3d 140 (D.D.C. 2015) (separation-of-powers challenge to Parole Commission rejected)
- Ramsey v. Faust, 943 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D.D.C. 2013) (Parole Commission decisions do not exercise judicial power)
- Campbell v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 563 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2008) (double jeopardy inapplicable to parole decisions)
- Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990) (standard for ex post facto violation: retroactive law altering definition of crimes or increasing punishment)
- Davis v. Moore, 772 A.2d 204 (D.C. 2001) (forfeiture of street time after parole revocation is valid under D.C. law)
- Smallwood v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 777 F. Supp. 2d 148 (D.D.C. 2011) (Parole Commission’s role limited to execution of sentence)
Decision: Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.