Richardson v. The UPS Store, Inc., 486 Mass. 126

Plaintiff Kevin Richardson used a UPS Store notary from 2012–2016 and on several occasions was charged $10 per transaction (including $1.25 for notarization and $8.75 in clerical fees).
Richardson sued The UPS Store and its franchisee under G. L. c. 262, § 41 (and G. L. c. 93A), alleging notaries may not charge more than $1.25 for notarizations.
The case was removed to federal court; the District Court certified a question to the SJC whether § 41 (and § 43), Executive Order No. 455, or the 2016 codification in G. L. c. 222 limit fees for any notarial act to $1.25.
G. L. c. 262, § 41 is a nineteenth‑century fee schedule that enumerates fees tied to the process of protesting dishonored negotiable instruments and includes the clause: "the whole cost of noting... shall in no case exceed one dollar and twenty‑five cents."
The SJC concluded "noting" in § 41 is a term of art tied to the protest process (an initial step in certifying dishonor), not a catchall for all notarial acts.
The court held that § 41 and § 43 do not cap fees for notarial acts unrelated to protest and that neither Executive Order No. 455 nor the 2016 amendments in G. L. c. 222 altered § 41's scope.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Scope of G. L. c. 262, § 41	§ 41's final clause caps all notarial fees at $1.25 ("the whole cost of noting").	§ 41’s fees are limited to protest‑related acts; "noting" is a protest term of art.	Section 41 governs protest/noting for dishonored negotiable instruments only; it does not cap fees for all notarial acts.
Effect of G. L. c. 262, § 43	§ 43 imports § 41’s $1.25 limit to all "like services," thus covering all notarial acts.	§ 43 means fees for services performed by different officials that are literally "like services" to those enumerated in c. 262; it does not expand § 41.	§ 43 does not expand § 41; it requires other officials performing the same enumerated services to follow § 41 fees but does not apply § 41’s protest‑limited cap to all notarizations.
Impact of Executive Order No. 455 and G. L. c. 222 (2016)	The Executive Order and the 2016 codification referenced § 41 and defined "notarial act," effectively extending § 41’s $1.25 cap to all notarial acts.	The Order and c. 222 merely referenced § 41 to enforce existing fee limits for protest acts and to authorize penalties; referencing does not amend § 41’s original scope.	Executive Order No. 455 and G. L. c. 222 do not alter § 41’s meaning; they enforce existing § 41 limits for protest‑related services and permit future fee limits by separate statute or order, but do not convert § 41 into a universal $1.25 cap.

Bailey v. Dozier, 47 U.S. 23 (1848) (discusses noting as a preliminary protest step and timing of protest certificates)
Opinion of the Justices, 150 Mass. 586 (1890) (recognizes noting and extending marine protests as principal notarial acts)
Howard v. Proctor, 7 Gray 128 (1856) (explains "like services" means statutorily prescribed fees for the same act by another official)
Simmons v. County of Suffolk, 230 Mass. 236 (1918) (applies the "like services" principle to compensation statutes)
ROPT Ltd. Partnership v. Katin, 431 Mass. 601 (2000) (courts should avoid statutory interpretations that produce illogical or meaningless results)
King v. Town Clerk of Townsend, 480 Mass. 7 (2018) (declines interpretations that render statutory text ambiguous or meaningless)
Attorney Gen. v. Commissioner of Ins., 450 Mass. 311 (2008) (discusses effect of "notwithstanding" clauses in indicating legislative intent)