Richardson v. Phillips
309 Ga. App. 773
Ga. Ct. App.2011Background
- Richardson sought removal of Miller County Commissioner Phillips for alleged illegal and unethical conduct related to a real estate transaction.
- The building on the Miller County courthouse square was ultimately to be deeded to Miller County without taxpayer funds, but Phillips was financially connected to the deal.
- Phillips initially financed part of Grow’s sale via a promissory note ($42,000) with annual payments and a prepayment penalty; Grow did not participate in an assumed debt agreement.
- In 1996 Phillips was elected; four years later the property was slated to be sold to an entity that would gift it to the County; Union Investment, Inc. and the Ruth T. Jinks Foundation were involved in the multi-party arrangement.
- Union agreed to assume Phillips’s debt and the County leased the building from Union; the Jinks Foundation donated funds to cover the annual payments; in 2005 the Foundation donated enough to retire the Grow note, and Union deeded the property to Miller County as a gift.
- Richardson filed suit in 2007 alleging unlawful and unethical conduct; the trial court granted summary judgment for Phillips; on remand the trial court again granted summary judgment for Phillips; this Court previously held the removal claim was not mooted and remanded for merits on removal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Local Act requires Phillips’s removal. | Richardson argues the Local Act's removal provisions apply to any prohibited interest. | Phillips argues statutes should be harmonized; the County received the property at no cost, mitigating self-dealing concerns. | No removal required; Local Act harmonized with OCGA 36-1-14 and does not compel removal under these facts. |
| Does the Local Act import the removal standard from OCGA § 36-1-14(a) or (b) to mandate removal here? | Richardson contends the Local Act imports the stricter removal standard. | Phillips contends the Local Act reads with OCGA § 36-1-14 in pari materia, preserving exemptions and relief. | Section 14 and OCGA § 36-1-14 are harmonized; the exemption in 36-1-14(a) applies, so removal is not required. |
Key Cases Cited
- Moore v. Whaley, 189 Ga. 647, 7 S.E.2d 394 (1940) (local acts may differ from general statutes for counties)
- SCA Svcs. of Ga. v. Fulton County, 238 Ga. 154, 231 S.E.2d 774 (1977) (local and general statutes on same subject should be construed together)
- Velasquez v. State, 276 Ga.App. 527, 623 S.E.2d 721 (2005) (avoid surplusage; construe related statutes together)
- Gavin v. State, 292 Ga.App. 402, 664 S.E.2d 797 (2008) (legislature’s use of broad references informative to intent)
- Randolph County v. Bantz, 270 Ga. 66, 508 S.E.2d 169 (1998) (interpretive framework: construe in light of legislative intent)
- Weldon v. Bd. of Comm'rs. of Monroe County, 212 Ga.App. 885, 443 S.E.2d 513 (1994) (statutory construction principle in local vs general)
- Morgan v. Woodard, 253 Ga. 751, 325 S.E.2d 369 (1985) (local and general statutes interwoven should be considered together)