Richardson v. Hardy, 855 F. Supp. 2d 809

Richardson was convicted in 1984 of the April 1980 armed robbery and murder of George Vrabel; sentence was death, later commuted to life without parole in 2003.
In 2004, habeas relief was granted due to prosecutorial misconduct; on appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed on prejudice grounds, then remanded in 2006 for remaining issues.
Richardson has four remaining claims: identifications allegedly obtained by suggestive procedures; Batson v. Kentucky claim of race-based peremptory strikes; admission of evidence of uncharged crimes; and ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase.
The court previously ordered an evidentiary hearing on the Batson issue; the hearing occurred in May 2009 with post-hearing briefing through June 2009.
The court ultimately held: no due process violation from other-crimes evidence or identification procedures; Batson claim proven, requiring a new trial; other post-conviction claims denied; a COA granted for the ineffective-assistance-at-sentencing issue only.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether admission of other-crimes evidence violated due process	Richardson argues prejudice from propensity-based evidence.	State argues evidence was highly relevant to identity and context and not unfairly prejudicial.	No due process violation; admission not unreasonably applied federal standards.
Whether identification testimony was unduly suggestive	Identification procedures violated due process due to suggestive pretrial steps.	Illinois courts properly applied Manson factors to assess reliability.	Not objectively unreasonable given reliability-focused analysis.
Batson claim—racially biased peremptory strikes	Prosecution used all peremptories against black jurors; pattern suggests discrimination; prejudice shown.	Prosecution explanations insufficient due to lapse of memory; post-hoc rationales allowed circumstantial reconstruction.	Batson violation established; new trial ordered.
Ineffective assistance of counsel at penalty phase	Counsel failed to investigate and present mitigating mental/social history.	Strategic decisions at sentencing were reasonable; evidence would not have changed outcome.	COA granted only for the ineffective-assistance-at-sentencing issue; merits not clearly established.

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (U.S. 1991) (due-process standard for evidentiary rulings in habeas)
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (U.S. 1977) (reliability as linchpin of identification admissibility)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (U.S. 2000) (unreasonable-manner standard for applying law to facts)
Griffin v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2010) (illustrates reasonable-application standard in 7th Circuit)
Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855 (U.S. 2010) (unreasonable determination of facts standard)
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (U.S. 2011) (deference for federal habeas petitions where reasonable jurists disagree)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (ineffective-assistance standard; reasonableness of investigation)
Cullen v. Pinholster, — U.S.— (U.S. 2011) (limits evidentiary record for § 2254(d) review to record before state court)
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (U.S. 1986) (prohibition on race-based peremptory strikes; three-step analysis)