Richardson v. Dept. of Health, 239 A.3d 695

Richardson was Personnel Director at RICA; MDH required use of JobAps for hires starting Nov 2014.
On July 26, 2016 Richardson hired Maurice Nelson without using JobAps and reclassified him twice without documentation.
DBM/OHR discovered the irregularity in August 2016; OHR requested documents which Richardson did not provide.
RICA CEO Basler investigated, interviewed Richardson (Aug 22) and held a mitigation conference (Aug 30); Richardson was placed on paid administrative leave and told to be available at home and by phone during business hours.
On Sept 2, Basler attempted to reach Richardson (texts/calls) for a 12:30 meeting; Richardson did not respond or appear. Basler then had a process server post a Notice of Termination at Richardson’s door at ~8:25 pm on Sept 2; the notice was removed by 8:55 pm.
OAH and the Circuit Court affirmed the termination; Richardson appealed to the Court of Special Appeals asserting procedural defects under SPP §11-106.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Timeliness of disciplinary action (30‑day limit under SPP §11-106(b))	Basler knew of misconduct on June 6 (email), so discipline on Sept 2 was after 30 days	Appointing authority didn't have sufficient knowledge to start the clock until Aug 8 when OHR raised concerns	Court held Aug 8 was the triggering date; Sept 2 termination was within 30 days, supported by substantial evidence
Failure to explain evidence / consider mitigation (SPP §11-106(a)(3); COMAR)	Agency failed to explain evidence and consider mitigation before discipline	Richardson was interviewed Aug 22 and given a mitigation conference Aug 30; he offered little explanation and withheld requested documents	Court held the agency provided adequate notice and considered mitigation; Richardson’s noncooperation undermined his claim
Timeliness of notice delivery (SPP §11-106(a)(5))	Notice was ineffective because delivered the day it became effective; Miley requires employee receive notice before effective date	Delivery on the effective date is permissible; Richardson purposefully avoided contact while required to be available, so same‑day delivery was reasonable	Court held same‑day delivery was timely here given Richardson’s avoidance and that delivery occurred within the 30‑day limit; Miley not controlling on these facts

W. Corr. Inst. v. Geiger, 371 Md. 125 (Md. 2002) (defines when appointing authority "acquires knowledge" sufficient to start the 30‑day disciplinary period)
Dep’t of Juv. Serv. v. Miley, 178 Md. App. 99 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (notice mailed on the 30th day may be untimely if employee could not receive it before the deadline)
Hughes v. Moyer, 452 Md. 77 (Md. 2017) (statutory notice requirement aims to ensure fair process)
Colburn v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Serv., 403 Md. 115 (Md. 2008) (describes the "reasoning mind" substantial‑evidence test)
Cosby v. Dep’t of Human Res., 425 Md. 629 (Md. 2012) ("look‑through" review: appellate court reviews agency decision with deference to factual findings)