Richards v. Copes-Vulcan, Inc., 213 A.3d 1196

Craig and Gloria Richards (Ohio residents) sued multiple manufacturers alleging Mr. Richards’ mesothelioma resulted from asbestos exposures at work and at home; remaining defendants were Ford, Goodyear, and Copes‑Vulcan.
Plaintiffs served an expert report by Dr. Mark Ginsburg opining that cumulative, non‑minimal exposures from each defendant were a substantial contributing cause of the disease.
While summary‑judgment briefing was pending, the Ohio Supreme Court decided Schwartz v. Honeywell, rejecting a pure cumulative‑exposure causation theory under Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.96.
Plaintiffs declined to timely supplement the expert report after Schwartz; instead they argued that § 2307.96 requires only factual evidence of manner, proximity, frequency, and length of exposure (no expert) to survive summary judgment.
The Delaware Superior Court granted defendants’ summary judgment (finding expert proof of specific causation required), denied reargument, and refused leave to supplement the expert report as untimely. Plaintiffs appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 2307.96 eliminates the need for expert proof of specific causation at summary judgment	§ 2307.96’s manner/proximity/frequency/length factors suffice; expert testimony is not required to survive summary judgment	§ 2307.96 addresses only exposure sufficiency (de minimis rule); expert proof of specific causation is still required	Held: Expert medical evidence of specific causation remains required to defeat summary judgment under Ohio law
Whether a cumulative‑exposure theory satisfies a plaintiff’s burden under § 2307.96	Cumulative theory (every non‑minimal exposure contributes) should be sufficient	Cumulative theory conflicts with statute’s individualized substantial‑factor requirement	Held: Cumulative‑only causation is insufficient under Schwartz and § 2307.96; statute requires defendant‑by‑defendant substantial‑factor analysis
Whether the Superior Court abused discretion by denying leave to supplement expert report after summary judgment	Plaintiffs sought leave to conform report to Schwartz after decision; should be allowed	Plaintiffs waited until after judgment; could have sought leave earlier; denial was within court’s discretion	Held: No abuse of discretion—denial of leave to supplement and denial of reargument affirmed

Schwartz v. Honeywell Int’l, 102 N.E.3d 477 (Ohio 2018) (rejecting cumulative‑exposure theory under Ohio’s asbestos causation statute)
Terry v. Caputo, 875 N.E.2d 72 (Ohio 2007) (expert testimony required for general and specific causation in toxic‑exposure claims)
Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986) (manner‑frequency‑proximity factors to assess exposure sufficiency)
Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp., 653 N.E.2d 1196 (Ohio 1995) (adopting Restatement substantial‑factor test rather than Lohrmann)
Darnell v. Eastman, 261 N.E.2d 114 (Ohio 1970) (laypersons cannot establish complex causal links without expert testimony)