Richard Wagoner v. Indiana Department of Correcti
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 1783
7th Cir.2015Background
- Richard Wagoner, a paraplegic long-term Indiana prisoner, sued IDOC and the Commissioner (official capacity) under §1983, Title II of the ADA, and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act for multiple disability-accommodation failures (toileting, cramped cell, sidewalk hazards, weight room/library access, wheelchair repair, medical supplies, exclusion from job training, unsafe transport).
- IDOC moved for summary judgment, arguing among other things that Wagoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the PLRA (42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)).
- Wagoner moved for a Pavey hearing to resolve factual disputes about exhaustion; the district court denied his first motion without prejudice and instructed him to include exhaustion evidence with his summary-judgment response.
- Wagoner filed his summary-judgment opposition but later (and out of time per the court’s direction) filed a separate renewed Pavey motion with additional deposition excerpts; the magistrate refused to consider the late materials and granted summary judgment to IDOC.
- The district court held only two grievances were exhausted (wheelchair repair and improper transport) and dismissed the §1983 claims (state actors not "persons") and the ADA/Rehabilitation Act claims for failure to show denial of access to services or programs.
- On appeal the Seventh Circuit considered (1) whether denial of the renewed Pavey hearing was erroneous and (2) whether summary judgment for IDOC and the Commissioner was proper; the court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a Pavey hearing was required on exhaustion | Wagoner argued disputed facts (officials prevented grievances; futility) warranted an evidentiary Pavey hearing | IDOC argued no genuine factual dispute requiring a hearing and court order required submissions combined with summary-judgment brief | Court: No abuse of discretion in refusing to consider Wagoner’s untimely Pavey materials; Pavey hearing not required after procedural noncompliance, though separate pre-summary-judgment hearing is best practice |
| Whether Wagoner exhausted administrative remedies under the PLRA | Wagoner claimed he exhausted some grievances and was prevented from exhausting others | IDOC argued most claims were unexhausted and the two exhausted grievances were the only adjudicable ones | Court: Only two grievances exhausted; remaining claims procedurally barred |
| Whether IDOC and Commissioner (official capacity) are liable under §1983 | Wagoner sought relief for constitutional deprivations | IDOC argued state agency and official-capacity suits are not "persons" under §1983 | Court: §1983 claims dismissed—state agency and official-capacity claims not viable under §1983 |
| Whether Title II ADA / §504 Rehabilitation Act claims survive on exhausted grievances | Wagoner argued wheelchair repair and transport incidents denied access to programs/services | IDOC argued surviving claims did not allege denial of programs/services "by reason of" disability | Court: ADA/Rehab Act claims fail—surviving incidents did not show denial of access to programs/services as required |
Key Cases Cited
- Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008) (sets procedure for district-court exhaustion hearings under the PLRA)
- Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (explains PLRA’s invigorated exhaustion requirement)
- Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (state agencies and officials sued in their official capacities are not "persons" under §1983)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (limits respondeat superior liability in §1983 claims against individuals)
- Love v. Westville Corr. Ctr., 103 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 1996) (Title II/§504 requires denial of access to programs or services to state a claim)
- Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2012) (parallels ADA and Rehabilitation Act analysis; federal-funding element for Rehab Act)